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DATA PROTECTION IN DISARRAY
Thomas D. Haley*
Abstract: B ine e
inel l e mi e indi id al
i a e inf ma i n, i h e l
that can be devastating. Federal courts often leave those individuals without legal recourse by
dismissing their lawsuits for lack of standing, even though plaintiffs in these cases provide
stronger showings of harm than courts usually require. Using an original data set, this Article
shows how standing analysis in these cases has gone awry and argues that the standing inquiry
in da da a-protection cases harms both public policy and standing doctrine.
This Article makes three contributions to literatures in federal courts and privacy. First, it
shows that current federal court practice too often allows data collectors to cause harm without
penalty. Data collectors from theme parks and grocery stores to Equifax and Google
routinely collect private information improperly and inadequately protect the data they collect.
This Article unpacks the various ways federal courts get standing wrong in the lawsuits that
follow, such as by focusing on the particular scraps of information collected or lost via data
b each find lain iff ha e n
ffe ed an inj
in fac . Sec nd, hi A icle d a
n an
original data set of 217 federal data-protection decisions to demonstrate systemic pressures
that lead federal courts to misapply standing doctrine in data-protection litigation. Existing
scholarship focuses on analyzing a handful of leading appellate cases and therefore misses the
f ll c e f fede al c
eeming h ili
a d da a-protection lawsuits. Third, by
bringing to light systemic issues that have not been considered in this context, this Article
e change
fede al c
a
ach
anding in hese cases that will help align the
incentives and costs of data collection and help to develop a robust body of federal law on
issues of data protection.
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INTRODUCTION
Six Flags theme parks require fingerprint scans from children.1 Both
Facebook and Google run facial recognition on user-uploaded photos to
identify the subjects of other photos.2 History shows that none of these
companies can be counted on to keep that data private; neither can the
federal courts be counted on to hear the lawsuits that follow. This Article
shows how standing doctrine an important but under-explored factor in
data-protection litigation prevents plaintiffs from prevailing in lawsuits,
1. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, 129 N.E.3d 1197 (sustaining lawsuit arising
nde he Illin i Bi me ic Inf ma i n P i ac Ac ( BIPA )).
2. Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (sustaining lawsuit alleging this
practice violated BIPA); Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (dismissing for
lack of standing lawsuit alleging similar claims).
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leaving them unprotected and federal laws unenforced. To do so, this
Article draws on empirical analysis of hundreds of hand-collected federal
decisions on standing.
E e da , b ine e c llec eam f indi id al
e nal da a.
Businesses use biometric identifiers like fingerprints and retinal scans
ubiquitously for tasks as mundane as time tracking.3 But in both collection
and brokerage, businesses routinely violate laws meant to protect
indi id al
i ac . Si Flag , f e am le, e i e ea n a h lde
to give up their fingerprints to park security and to scan their fingerprints
each time they visit the park. While this data collection may help protect
he heme a k c
n je el 4 from wily teenagers sharing a single
ea n a , Si Flag ac i n al
i la e Illin i Bi me ic Inf ma i n
Privacy Act.5 Other businesses also routinely disregard federal statutes.
Numerous cable companies have violated the Cable Communications
P lic Ac (CCPA) data destruction requirements by illegally keeping
f me c
me
ec d f
ea
af e
e mination of the
customer relationship.6
Yet federal judges have been strangely hesitant to open the courthouse
doors to plaintiffs in these cases. Even where defendants have clearly
acted illegally, federal courts routinely dismiss data-protection lawsuits
for lack of standing.7 Drawing on analysis of a hand-collected dataset of
over 200 federal data protection cases, this Article shows that factors
including overreliance on inapplicable precedent and drift from the
purposes of standing doctrine drive these decisions. The Article then
proposes solutions for those problems.
To gain access to federal court, a plaintiff must establish that they have
Article III standing by satisfying a three-part test that, in theory, applies
equally to all types of cases.8 In the United States S eme C
c en
3. See, e.g., McGinnis v. U.S. Cold Storage, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d 813 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (dismissing
for lack of standing lawsuit arising from fingerprint time-tracking).
4. See, e.g., Raging Bull, SIX FLAGS GREAT AM.,
https://www.sixflags.com/greatamerica/attractions/raging-bull [https://perma.cc/E9E2-B5YL]
(asking Do You Have What It Takes to Tame the Bull? ); Giant Drop, SIX FLAGS GREAT AM.,
https://www.sixflags.com/greatamerica/attractions/giant-drop [https://perma.cc/H545-LXD5]
(allegedly Taking Screams to New Heights ).
5. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2019) (setting forth restrictions on collection of biometric
information).
6. See, e.g., Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017) (dismissing CCPA
lawsuit for lack of standing); Braitberg v. Charter Commc ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016)
(same).
7. See Gubala, 846 F.3d 909; Braitberg, 836 F.3d 925.
8. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (holding that A icle III of the Constitution
c nfine he fede al c
adj dica ing ac al ca e and c n
e ie . . . . The Art[icle] III
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conception, the crux of that inquiry is whether a plaintiff has suffered an
inj
in fac a he hand f he defendan ; ha i , a ha m ha i
fficien l c nc e e and a ic la i ed. 9 Modern standing doctrine
has primarily developed in the context of hot-button issues, including
environmental protection,10 religious schooling,11 same-sex marriage,12
and government surveillance.13 This heritage proves an unsteady
foundation for recent developments in data-protection litigation, where
the ethereal nature of data and the possibility of harm that might flow from
its loss lead the courts to additional philosophical questions. If an
employee clocks in and out with her fingerprint but does not receive
statutorily mandated information about retention of that fingerprint, is she
ha med? If Ube le a hacke eal a d i e name, licen e n mbe , bank
account number, and bank routing number, may the driver sue before the
hacke
e he d i e iden i ?14 As a result, courts applying the same
Supreme Court precedent in the data-protection context have reached
doctrine that requires a li igan
ha e anding
in ke he
e f a fede al c
i e ha
he m im
an doctrine of justiciability).
9. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (vacating and
remanding lawsuit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for additional analysis of the concreteness of
plaintiff s alleged harm).
10. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (dismissing for lack of standing lawsuit
under citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act).
11. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011) (dismissing for lack of
standing lawsuit challenging state s provision of tax credit to taxpayers contributing money to
religious schools).
12. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (holding private parties seeking to defend
constitutionality of California s Proposition 8 lacked standing to do so where state declined to defend
the proposition).
13. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (dismissing for lack of standing lawsuit
by attorneys, human rights workers, and other organizations challenging widespread surveillance
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act). Richard Fallon argues that the Supreme Court s
standing jurisprudence is inconsistently applied and depends on factors including the justices
political views. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061,
1096 (2015) (noting that [ ]i h he R be C
, a i h edece
Courts, it is possible to
distinguish judicial conservatives from liberals and to characterize some standing rulings as having
ei he a libe al a c n e a i e alence ). S ch c nce n a e n ne
Gene Nichol, for example,
deemed the inconsistency of standing j i
dence adicall n a i f ing. Gene R. Nich l, J .,
Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304 (2002) (arguing that
anding anal i
ema icall fa
he
e f l e he
e le ).
14. Put another way, Seth Kreimer has likened disagreement over the sufficiency of informational
injuries to early skepticism about the theory of quantum mechanics. See Seth F. Kreimer, S ook
Action at a Distance : In angible Inj
in Fac in he Info ma ion Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745,
751 52 (2016) (a g ing ha inf ma i nal inj ie fa all nde mine an acc n f A icle III that
in i
n di ec , angible, and al able inj ie
h ical r economic interests as the ticket of
admi i n
he fede al c
h e, and
f ndl al e n i n f a ic la i ed and imminen
inj
).
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results that are divergent, if not irreconcilable.
Normatively, whether isolated instances of improper data collection or
data loss should suffice for standing is a contested issue. Many scholars
have argued, emphatically, yes, with contentions ranging from broad
theories of probabilistic standing to specific examples of courts treating
privacy harms with unwarranted exceptionalism.15 But many federal
courts seem to disagree. Judicial reticence to recognize harm in dataprotection litigation contributes to rampant, judicially approved,
consequence-free lawbreaking by businesses, which continue to
improperly collect, store, trade, and lose valuable private information.
Along the way, at every level of the federal judicial system, courts have
departed from prevailing formulations of standing doctrine, subverted the
j ifica i n f
he d c ine e i ence, and engaged f eel in
speculation about the nature and extent of data-protection harms.16
This Article bridges the gap between theory and reality in explaining
fede al c
el c ance
en e ain da a-protection lawsuits. Part I
shows that federal courts have departed from traditional conceptions of
standing doctrine and its underlying purposes in data-protection litigation,
to the detriment of individual litigants and the judicial system. While the
scholarly literature advocates the normative position that the courts have
gone astray, it is limited by its reliance on a handful of leading cases that

15. In general, for example, Jonathan Nash has argued for taking a present-value approach to
probabilistic standing. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283
(2013) (proposing expected-value analysis as basis for assessing injury-in-fact and redressability
prongs of standing inquiry). Andrew Hessick has similarly argued against requiring a high risk of
harm to establish standing as unsupported by Article III. See F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic
Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 58 (2012) ( A icle III does not impose a minimum riske i emen . ). In he ecific c n e
f da a
ec i n, Danielle Ci n and Daniel S l e a g e
that increased risk of identity theft and anxiety about the consequences of data breach resemble a
variety of harms in other contexts that have been held enough to satisfy Article III. See Daniel J.
Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV.
737, 744 (2018) ( [A]n ie and i k, ge he and al ne, de erve recognition as compensable
ha m . ). Julie Cohen challenges the incoherent distinctions between data-protection cases and other
types of litigation, as well as those between lawsuits arising from data breaches versus data gathering.
See Julie E. Cohen, Information Privacy Litigation as Bellwether for Institutional Change, 66
DEPAUL L. REV. 535, 548 (2017) (noting that, in contrast to the urgency with which data breaches
a e ea ed, he e a e n e ed in e e in c ea ing a c m a able en e f eme gency about processes
that underlie a multibillion-d lla ind
). Feli W e l e he a in hich i ac li iga i n
ha changed c
a
ach
anding a he m
f ndamen al le el . See Felix T. Wu, How
Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 439 (2017) ( Whe ea lde anding ca e
focused on whether the plaintiff before the court was the right plaintiff, the newer privacy-based cases
are focused on, or making assumptions about, whether or not the harm caused by the defendant is the
igh kind f ha m. ).
16. Indeed, Wu argues that the federal courts are engaged in usurpation of the legislative branch s
powers in the realm of data protection. See Wu, supra note 15, at 458.
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leaves the extent of the problem unclear. Part II reveals how serious the
problem of standing in data-protection litigation has become and, in doing
so, provides empirical support for existing critiques of federal courts
handling of these cases. Drawing on analysis of over 200 federal decisions
on standing in data-protection cases,17 this Part identifies potential drivers
f he c
c i
deci i n-making. Among other conclusions, this
analysis shows that courts rely
hea il n he S eme C
2013
decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA18 and appear to analyze
standing from the wrong starting point. Finally, Part III discusses the
theoretical and practical implications of correcting these errors.
Theoretically, it argues that standing doctrine requires a more nuanced
approach than the mechanical application of the one-size-fits-all test
currently employed by courts. Practically, it explores ways to put the
courts back on course and the benefits that would flow from allowing
more data-protection lawsuits to advance to determination on the merits.
I.

THE LIMITS OF MODERN STANDING DOCTRINE IN DATAPROTECTION CASES

Standing doctrine arises from the United States Constitution. Article III
provides that [ ]he j dicial P e hall e end
ce ain, en me a ed
e f Ca e and C n
e ie . 19 When there is no Case or
Controversy, the judicial power does not exist, and the court must dismiss
the case. From this straightforward foundation rises an area of law of
paramount importance and complexity.20
In later Parts, this Article shows how doctrinal drift from the purposes
of standing doctrine occurred in data-protection cases and why it is vitally
important to refocus the doctrine. This Part sets the stage. Section I.A.
provides a brief overview of the state of standing doctrine in dataprotection litigation. Section I.B. highlights how standing doctrine has
failed to adapt to these cases and particularly the types of harms
underlying them.
17. This dataset represents a substantially complete set of data-protection standing cases decided
after the Supreme Court s influential decision in Clapper.
18. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
20. The Framers declined to define either Case or Controversy or to leave much recorded
discussion on what they meant. As Chief Justice Warren put it, h e
d ha e an icebe g
quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very
heart of our constitutional form of g e nmen . Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 93 94 (1968) (holding
that taxpayers had standing to seek injunction against government spending on materials for use in
religious schools).
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Standing in Data-Protection Litigation

Standing is a threshold, jurisdictional requirement in any federal case.
To cross that threshold, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test. They must
show first, that they suffered an injury-in-fact; second, that the injury is
traceable to the defendant; and third, that the injury is redressable by a
favorable decision.21 For all that the courts emphasize the constitutional
nature of standing doctrine, in fact, the Constitution does not refer to
standing. Rather, the doctrine is purely a judge-made interpretation of
Article III
Ca e and C n
e ie
i i n. The d c ine
amorphous character has led to inconsistent results that underscore the
difficulties in its application.22
1.

The Purposes of Standing Doctrine

Judges developed standing doctrine in service of two primary goals:
maintaining the separation of powers and ensuring that cases are
adversarial in nature.23
First, standing prevents the judiciary from encroaching on the
responsibilities of the legislative and executive branches. Where a
plaintiff has suffered no injury, or their injury is not traceable to the
conduct of the defendant, suspicion arises that the plaintiff may be using
the judicial system to address a political grievance a grievance that

21. This is a slight simplification of the test prescribed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 61 (1992) ( O e he ea ,
ca e ha e e abli hed ha he
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have
ffe ed an inj
in fac
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
a ic la i ed and (b) ac al imminen , n
c njec al
h
he ical. Sec nd, he e m
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of the injury has to be
fai l . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the
inde enden ac i n f me hi d a n bef e he c
. Thi d, i m be likel , a
ed
merel
ec la i e, ha he inj
ill be ed e ed b a fa able deci i n. (citations omitted)).
22. Thus, Chief Justice Warren acknowledged that [ ]a
f he diffic l in gi ing eci e
meaning and form to the concept of justiciability stems from the uncertain historical antecedents of
the case-and-c n
e d c ine. Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 96.
23. See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102
MICH. L. REV. 689, 694 (2004) ( The e i n f hich a ie ma
e l c me
c
vindicate these different kinds of legal rights is central to the issue of standing. In trying to address
that question, American courts have traditionally drawn partly upon general principles of
jurisprudence and partly upon distinctively American ideas about popular sovereignty, limited
government, and the separation of powers. ); see also Hessick, supra note 15, at 56 ( Courts cannot
decide legal questions in the abstract based on hypothetical disputes. As the Supreme Court has told
us, the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III limits the federal judiciary to resolving legal
e i n nl in he c n e
f ed e ing
e en ing an ac al
h ea ened inj
e l ing
from violations of the law. ).
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should be addressed by the elected branches of government.24 This
justification has clear appeal. Fairchild v. Hughes25 is a paradigmatic case.
In that case, plaintiff Charles Fairchild, a New York businessman, sued to
restrain the government from enforcing the Nineteenth Amendment,
which prohibits the government from denying citizens the right to vote on
the basis of sex.26 Fai child he
f he ca e a
ained,
i
charitably. He argued that the Secretary of State was on the verge of
proclaiming the Nineteenth Amendment valid.27 This, in turn, meant that
the Attorney General could soon be called upon to enforce it.28 Fairchild
alleged there were questions about the validity of the process of the
Amendmen
a age h gh a e legi la e .29 Thus, if the Secretary
of State and Attorney General did what he predicted, they would mislead
state election officials into permitting women to vote, thereby
e en [ing] a ce ainmen f he i he
f he legall
alified
30
e .
The Supreme Court denied standing, recognizing this as a
politically-motivated and convoluted attempt by a private litigant to
coerce the judiciary into stepping outside its role in the constitutional
structure.31
Second, standing is necessary for the functioning of the adversarial
system employed by the federal courts. That system relies primarily on
opposing parties with enough at stake in the dispute to ensure that all
relevant evidence, law, and argument on any given issue is put before the
judge.32 This ad e a ial
em j ifica i n f
anding d c ine i a
least as appealing as the separation of powers. It is easy to see that legal
24. See, e.g., Clapper . Amne In l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (n ing ha [ ]he la f
Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial
process from being used to usu he
e f he li ical b anche ). J ice P ell cha ac e i ed
anding a nece a
e en he e f he j dicial
em f am h
gene al
e ii n f
he e a i n f g e nmen . United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (opining that expanding the judicial power to taxpayer suits would work to the detriment
of the federal judicial system).
25. 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ( The igh f ci i en f he Uni ed S a e
e hall n be denied
ab idged b he Uni ed S a e
b an a e n acc n f e . ).
27. Fairchild, 258 U.S. at 127 28.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 127.
30. Id. at 128.
31. Id. at 129.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961) (e lling he clea c nc e eness
provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of
adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and
demanding in e e ).
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precedent created on an issue being argued by parties who lacked
sufficient incentive to put on their best case may be flawed.33 By closing
the courthouse doors in these instances, standing doctrine helps to
preserve the benefits of an adversarial, common-law judicial system.
However, neither of these justifications applies to all types of cases.
Lawsuits between private parties typically implicate the adversarial
justification but have little to do with the separation of powers. Johnson
v. United Air Lines, Inc.,34 a recent district court case, provides an
example. Johnson a e f m Uni ed
e i emen ha J hn n, a
baggage handler, use his fingerprints to clock in and out of work.35 United,
in violation of a statute, did not disclose its data-retention practices or
obtain consent from Johnson and his coworkers to collect their biometric
information.36 This dispute does not raise any separation-of-powers
concerns. It is for the courts to adjudicate whether a defendant has violated
law and in doing so harmed a plaintiff. But questions might linger whether
plaintiffs have enough at stake in such a case to put forth meaningful
argument and evidence. In Johnson, plaintiff alleged only that he and his
colleagues were deprived of notice and disclosure mandated by a statute.37
Whether that gave him enough of a stake in the dispute to put forth a
serious case is less clear than, for instance, a claim that defective
equipment caused a suitcase to fall on him.
Despite the lack of overlap in the leading justifications for standing
doctrine, the Supreme Court mandates a one-size-fits-all inquiry. It is no
surprise, then, that the federal courts have struggled to consistently apply
he e . Tha lack f c n i enc manife in he c
a ied ea men
of cases depending on the context in which they arise.38 The burgeoning
area of data-protection litigation is a prime example.
2.

Confounding Strains of Data-Protection Litigation

Various factors in data-protection litigation further complicate the
standing inquiry. Imagine a typical data breach: hackers have stolen data
from millions of consumers stored by, say, an online retailer. But what
types of data? How much? What can the hackers reasonably be expected
33. Examples of federal courts doing exactly that in data-protection litigation are discussed in
section II.B.
34. No. 17 C 08858, 2018 WL 3636556 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2018).
35. Id. at *1.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *3.
38. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 13, at 1071 80 (analyzing divergent standing analysis in cases
arising in contexts such as the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and national
security).
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to do with the data? Have affected consumers seen signs of identity theft?
If so, are they attributable to this hack, or any number of other hacks over
the years?
Still more confounding factors arise in cases where companies have
improperly collected data but have not lost it. Cable companies, for
instance, routinely retain personal information of former customers. The
CCPA forbids this practice, but the customer has no reason to believe
anybody other than the cable company has access to the information. Is
the bare statutory violation enough of a harm to establish standing?
Decisions on standing have turned on the answers to these questions,
and the outcomes are not consistent. This Article identifies three leading
categories of confounding factors present in data-protection litigation: the
probabilistic harm strain, the intangible harm strain, and the
temporal strain.
a.

The Probabilistic Harm Strain

A common question in data-protection litigation is one of probabilities.
Plaintiffs in these cases are worse off than they would have been had data
collectors better secured their data, or not retained it beyond the period
authorized by statute. But it is hard for judges or anyone to estimate
precisely how much harm plaintiffs will suffer. A hacker might use stolen
information to bring one plaintiff to absolute financial ruin; another
lain iff inf ma i n migh ne e be ed. The cable c m an migh
lose improperly retained information, subjecting the plaintiff to that same
roll of the dice; but then, the company might never lose the data.
Because probabilistic standing is at the heart of much data-protection
litigation, Clapper, a case arising out of post-9/11 government
surveillance, looms large over the analysis.39 There, respondents sued to
enjoin NSA surveillance conducted under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978.40 Amendments to that Act permitted the NSA
to surveil a target without demonstrating probable cause that the a ge i
a f eign
e
agen f a f eign
e and i h
ecif ing he
nature and location of each of the particular facilities or places at which

39. Cla e . Amne In l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). Other scholars pin much of the blame for
judicial mishandling of privacy cases on the Clapper decision. See, e.g., Solove & Citron, supra note
15, at 741 (noting ha [i]n deci i n af e deci i n, c
ha e elied n Clapper to dismiss datab each ca e ); see also id. a 744 (n ing ha Clapper and Spokeo have led to confusion about how
ha m in l ing e nal da a h ld be c nce ali ed ). That contention finds substantial empirical
support. See infra section II.A.
40. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 406 07.
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he elec nic
eillance ill cc . 41 Respondents challenged the
constitutionality of this statutory scheme. To support standing, they
alleged ha he e i an bjec i el ea nable likelih d ha hei
c mm nica i n ill be ac i ed b NSA
eillance and ha he i k
of surveillance . . . is so substantial that they have been forced to take
costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their
international communications. 42
The Supreme Court, invoking the separation-of-powers justification,43
ejec ed e nden a g men . Wi h e ec
e nden claimed
future harm the bjec i el ea nable likelih d f c mm nica i n
interception the Court held that for a future harm to be c nc e e
en gh
anding, i m be ce ainl im ending. 44 Writing
for the majori , J ice Ali cha ac e i ed e nden a g men a a
five-step chain of causation, which he deemed hei highl
ec la i e
45
fea .
In contrast, the dissent proceeded from the adversarial
justification46 in contending that respondents established a sufficient
probability of future harm to justify standing.
In Part II, this Article analyzes hundreds of data-protection cases
decided after Clapper to show, among other things, that Clapper has
bec me a c e iece f he c
ea ning in da a-protection litigation.
Numerous leading circuit court opinions in data-protection cases have
discussed Clapper, usually extensively, in assessing standing.47 In the
41. Id. at 404.
42. Id. at 407.
43. Id. at 408 ( The la f A icle III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles,
serves to prevent the j dicial
ce f m being ed
he
e f he li ical b anche . ).
44. Id. at 409 10 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 (1992)).
45. Id. a 410 ( [R]e nden a g men e
n hei highl
ec la i e fea ha : (1) he
Government will decide to target the communications of non-U.S. persons with whom they
communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to invoke its authority under § 1881a
rather than utilizing another method of surveillance; (3) the Article III judges who serve on the
[F eign In elligence S eillance C
] ill c ncl de ha he G e nmen
ed
eillance
procedures satisfy § 1881a man afeg a d and a e c n i en i h he F
h Amendmen ; (4) he
G e nmen ill cceed in in e ce ing he c mm nica i n f e nden c n ac ; and (5)
respondents will be parties to the particular communications that the Governmen in e ce . ).
46. S anding hel
en e ha he legal e i n
e en ed
he fede al c
ill n ake
he f m f ab ac in ellec al
blem e l ed in he a ified a m he e f a deba ing cie
b in ead h e e i n ill be e en ed in a c nc e e fac al c n e c nd ci e a eali ic
a ecia i n f he c n e ence f j dicial ac i n. Id. at 423 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
47. See, e.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Beck v. McDonald, 848
F.3d 262, 267 68 (4th Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App x 384, 388 (6th
Cir. 2016); In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2017); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp.,
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federal judicial system as a whole, of the 209 data-protection cases studied
for this Article, 49% cited Clapper and that number rises to 69% of
decisions finding that plaintiffs lacked standing.48
But Clapper is the wrong foundation for conducting a standing inquiry
in data-protection litigation for several reasons.49 Most substantially, it is
a poor fit in that separation-of-powers concerns predominate: the case
involves a claim against the government based on an allegedly
unconstitutional statutory scheme50 and directly implicates issues of
national security.51 In contrast, most data-protection cases involve private,
non-governmental parties in disputes unrelated to such lofty issues.
Clapper is not the only source of confusion. As a general rule, federal
decisions on standing in data-protection litigation are not a model of
clarity. The confusion goes all the way to the top, with the Supreme
C
deci i n in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.52 There, Thomas Robins
sought to bring a class-ac i n la
i again he people search engine
Spokeo for alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).53
According to the complaint, Spokeo gathered and disseminated
information about Robins such as that he was married with children, had
a graduate degree, and was employed at a high-paying job.54 Unhappily
for Robins, none of that was true.55 R bin alleged ha S ke
inacc a e e
ing i la ed he FCRA e i emen ha en i ie like
Spokeo ensure the accuracy of their reporting, entitling Robins to an
award of statutory damages.56
LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2015).
48. More detailed empirical analysis of Clapper s impact on data-protection cases is set forth in
Part II.
49. Among them the fact that Justice Alito s casual dismissal of respondents fears quickly proved
to be so very wrong. See, e.g., Jameel Jaffer & Patrick C. Toomey, How the Government Misled the
Supreme Court on Warrantless Wiretapping, THE NATION (Dec. 18, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-government-misled-supreme-court-warrantlesswiretapping/ [https://perma.cc/GK3K-WE98] (discussing Edward Snowden s revelations about NSA
wiretapping).
50. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408 ( In kee ing i h he
e f [ anding] d c ine,
anding
inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide
whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was
unconstitutional. ).
51. See id. at 409 ( [W]e ha e f en f nd a lack of standing in cases in which the Judiciary has
been requested to review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence gathering and
f eign affai . ).
52. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
53. Id. at 1544.
54. Id. at 1546.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1545 (noting the FCRA requires that c n me e
ing agencie . . . f ll
ea nable
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R bin s difficulty arose from the fact that he asserted only a
echnical i la i n f he FCRA in other words, Spokeo violated a
statute, but it was not clear that Robins was harmed by the violation. For
the District Court, that was not enough to confer standing.57 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed,58 and many commentators believed the Supreme
C
b e en g an f ce i a i
ld lead a deci i n cla if ing
standing issues in data-protection litigation.59
The Supreme Court did not oblige. After reiterating the importance of
standing doctrine to ensuring the separation of powers,60 the Court punted
n he f ndamen al i e b
li ing he concrete and particularized
element of the injury-in-fact test, holding that the Ninth Circuit did not
e l anal e he concreteness f R bin s harm, and remanded for
further consideration.61 As a result, Spokeo stands for little more than a
reaffirmation that intangible harms can be sufficiently concrete to confer
standing but provides no guidance on how to assess concreteness.
b.

The Intangible Harm Strain

Perhaps the only point of agreement among the circuit courts is that
actual evidence of identity theft closely following a data breach is
actionable.62 But the more typical case involves harms that are much less
tangible breach or improper collection has occurred, but identity theft
has not yet been observed. Several circuits have denied standing in these
ced e
a
e ma im m
ible acc ac f c n me e
, and bjec
an e n
who willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the FCRA] with respect to any
indi id al . . . [ ] ei he ac al damage
a
damage f $100 $1,000 e i la i n, c
f he ac i n and a ne fee , and
ibl
ni i e damage ).
57. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV10 05306 ODW, 2011 WL 597867, at *1 2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27,
2011) (finding allegations of possible future harm insufficient for standing).
58. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 14 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding plaintiff s allegations
of violation of statutory rights under the FCRA sufficed for standing).
59. See, e.g., Daniel Townsend, Who Should Define Injuries for Article III Standing?, 68 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 76, 77 (2015) (stating that he S eme C
i n in he b ine
f im le e
correction, and Spokeo would not have garnered so much attention including over thirty amicus
briefs if it presented only a question that was easily resolved by preexisting standing doctrine ).
60. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546 47 ( The Constitution confers limited authority on each branch of
the Federal Government. . . . In order to remain faithful to this tripartite structure, the power of the
Federal Judiciary may not be permitted to intrude upon the powers given to the other
branches. . . . [Standing] doctrine developed in our case law to ensure that federal courts do not exceed
hei a h i a i ha been adi i nall nde
d. ).
61. Id. at 1548 50 (elucidating a distinction between c nc e e and a ic la i ed for purposes
of standing analysis).
62. See, e.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ( Nobody doubts that
identity theft, should it befall one of these plaintiffs, would constitute a concrete and particularized
inj . ).
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types of cases. For example, the Fourth Circuit denied standing in Beck v.
McDonald,63 where two data breaches at a medical center resulted in the
l
f he lain iff
e nal inf ma ion including names, social
security numbers, birth dates, physical descriptors, and medical
diagnoses.64 The Fourth Circuit pointed to the absence of allegations that
he c m mi ed inf ma i n had been ed
lain iff de imen in he
intervening years in denying standing. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit
denied standing to all plaintiffs save one in In re SuperValu, Inc.,65 in
which hackers breached the payment-card system of a grocery chain.66
The only plaintiff who squeaked through the standing inquiry was the one
who alleged a fraudulent charge appeared on his payment card.67 The
court looked to the fact that no social security numbers, birth dates, or
d i e licen e n mbe
e e alleged ha e been len, and f nd ha
without that information it would be unlikely that the data thief could open
ne acc n
ing lain iff iden i ie .68
The Se en h Ci c i deci i n in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group
LLC69 stands as the polar opposite to Beck in the data-breach context.
Where Beck found no standing even though bad actors purloined highly
sensitive information including social security numbers, Remijas found
standing even though plaintiffs alleged only the theft of credit card
numbers, not social security numbers or birth dates. Beck relied on a
constellation of highly specific and often dubious arguments against
finding standing, such as distinguishing other cases on the grounds that
he in l ed allega i n ha the data thief intentionally targeted the
personal information compromised in the data breaches. 70 Remijas offers
a more straightforward approach that seems more apt for what is supposed
to be a threshold, non-merits inquiry, finding it plausible to infer that
hackers who obtained the private information of plaintiffs intended to use

63. 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017).
64. Id. at 267 (finding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue based on risk of harm following data breach
that compromised personally identifying information and health information).
65. 870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2017).
66. Id. (finding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue based on risk of harm following data breach that
compromised payment card information).
67. Id. at 772.
68. Id. at 770.
69. 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
70. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017). Beck is not the first appellate decision
to indulge in curious arguments about a data thief s motivations. In Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., the Third
Circuit denied standing in part on the grounds that [h]ere, there is no evidence that the intrusion was
intentional or malicious. 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011).
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that inf ma i n,
lain iff de imen .71
Indeed, Beck notwithstanding, courts have been more apt to find
standing when more information is allegedly lost. For instance, in two
recent cases,72 data breaches led to loss of information including names,
birth dates, and social security numbers, among other types of
information. Both courts found the threat of harm sufficient to confer
standing.73 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit echoed Remijas, finding it
plausible to infer a substantial risk of harm from hackers obtaining the
personal information of plaintiffs and declining to penalize plaintiffs for
filing suit before actually suffering identity theft.74
Cases involving wrongful collection rather than data breach present
di inc i e . The S eme C
fail e to offer meaningful guidance
in Spokeo is of particular importance in these cases. In one influential
case, Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.,75 the plaintiff learned that Time
Warner Cable continued to keep private information about him, including
his date of birth, social security number, address, phone numbers, and
credit card information some eight years after he cancelled his cable
subscription. The plaintiff alleged that this constituted a straightforward
violation of the CCPA, which required Time Warner to destroy all that
information once it no longer had a customer relationship with Gubala.76
B he Se en h Ci c i f nd ha Time Wa ne
na h i ed e en i n
f lain iff inf ma i n did n ac all ha m lain iff.77

71. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 ( A hi age in he li igation, it is plausible to infer that the
plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus data breach. Why else would
hacke b eak in a
e da aba e and eal c n me
i a e inf ma i n? P e mabl , he
purpose of the hack i ,
ne
la e ,
make f a d len cha ge
a me h e c n me
iden i ie . ).
72. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622 23 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 663 F. App x 384, 386 87 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding plaintiffs had standing to sue based on
risk of future harm following data breach that compromised personal information).
73. See Attias, 865 F.3d at 622 23; Galaria, 663 F. App x at 386 87.
74. Galaria, 663 F. App x at 388 ( The e i n need f
ec la i n he e Plain iff allege ha
their data has already been stolen and is now in the hands of ill-intentioned criminals. . . . Where
Plaintiffs already know that they have lost control of their data, it would be unreasonable to expect
Plaintiffs to wait for actual misuse a fraudulent charge on a credit card, for example before taking
e
en e hei
n e nal and financial ec i . ).
75. 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding plaintiff lacked standing to sue based on defendant s
unlawful retention of personal information beyond time mandated for destruction).
76. Id. at 910. Specifically, the statute
ide ha a cable e a
hall de
e nall
identifiable information if the information is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was
c llec ed and he e a e n ending e e
de f acce
ch inf ma i n. Id.
77. Id. at 913.
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The Temporal Strain

Further complicating matters is the fact that many data-protection cases
do not involve observed identity theft, and for good reason. As the
Seventh Circuit noted in Remijas, the longer a plaintiff waits for identity
theft to occur before bringing suit, the more likely a defendant is to be
able to argue that an intervening data breach caused the harm.78 Plaintiffs
stuck choosing between suing shortly after a data breach (alleging only an
increased risk of identity theft) or years down the line when fraudulent
charges have appeared (possibly as a result of any number of other
intervening data breaches) have generally chosen the former course. In
doing so, they often trade a merits problem for a threshold one. Judicial
demands for allegations of actual identity theft force plaintiffs into a loselose situation.
B.

Recurring Errors

That the federal courts get standing in data-protection litigation wrong
cannot, of course, be taken for granted. Scholars have raised many issues
i h he c
ea ning in leading cases for example, shifting the
locus of the standing inquiry, myopically viewing asserted harms, and
miscalculating risk. Pulling together these strains of criticism, broader
discussion of standing doctrine, and analysis of the case law, this Article
shows that courts routinely err in these cases in two critical ways. First,
courts wrongly focus on the nature of the harm rather than the party
asserting the harm. Second, courts flub their assessment of the harm itself.
1.

Harm-Centered Standing

The three-part anding e
e and effec
e e, f m i
inception and for decades, focused on ensuring that the correct plaintiff
brought a given claim.79 Cases since Clapper, however, have pivoted
away from focusing on the party asserting a harm and toward an inquiry
into the sufficiency of the harm itself, injecting further confusion in data78. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) ( Re i ing he
lain iff
ai f he h ea ened ha m
ma e iali e in de
e
ld c ea e a diffe en
problem: he m e ime ha a e be een a da a b each and an in ance f iden i hef , he m e
la i de a defendan ha
a g e ha he iden i hef i n fai l aceable
he defendan da a
b each. (ci a i n mi ed)).
79. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 100 (1968) (h lding ha
hen anding i laced in
issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to
e e an adj dica i n f a a ic la i e and n
he he he i e i elf i j iciable ); see also
Wu, supra note 15, at 440 44 (collecting cases).
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protection cases. As Felix Wu has convincingly demonstrated, dataprotection cases are driving this shift, with consequences that cascade
outside the realm of data-protection litigation.80
The S eme C
hi ic f c
n a
a he han ha m i e iden
from the early modern standing cases. Flast v. Cohen,81 for example,
recognized that [ ]he f ndamen al a ec f anding i ha i f c e n
the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the
i e he i he
ha e adj dica ed. 82 In his survey of major standing
cases, Wu demonstrates that the focus on party prevailed at least until
Clapper.83 But lower court cases following Clapper, and arguably the
Supreme Court itself in Spokeo, focused the inquiry on whether privacy
ha m a e ha m f
e f anding.
The Se en h Ci c i
anding di mi al in Gubala is the paradigmatic
case. There, the court held that the aggrieved cable c
me c ld n
more sue than someone who, though he has never subscribed and means
never to subscribe to a cable company, nevertheless is outraged by the
thought that Time Warner and perhaps other cable companies are
violating a federal statute with apparent impunity. 84 In other words, the
court held expressly that, for standing purposes, the identity of the
plaintiff is irrelevant, or at most secondary to the question of whether there
has been a proper harm. That holding could not be farther from the rule
followed by the Supreme Court for decades that standing is about the
parties, not the issues. It is also difficult to situate within either of the
primary justifications for standing. The separation of powers is not
enhanced by focusing on harm rather than party; if anything, the opposite
is true the Gubala c
h
he ical c nce ned ci i en, like he
plaintiff in Fairchild, sets up the quintessential separation-of-powers
standing dismissal. Likewise, the concerned citizen has little, if any, stake
in the outcome of such a dispute compared to an affected former customer.
Gubala, therefore, cannot be said to proceed from the adversarial
justification either.85
80. Wu, supra note 15, at 446 57 (tracing development of standing jurisprudence).
81. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
82. Id. at 99.
83. See Wu, supra note 15, at 442 46 (discussing, inter alia, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, and Summers v. Earth Island Institute).
84. Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 911 12 (7th Cir. 2017).
85. Highlighting how unmoored the Gubala decision is from earlier conceptions of standing, Wu
notes that the Seventh Circuit effectively treated as insignificant the fact that the plaintiffs in the case
were suing on the basis of their inf ma i n ha ing been e ained and n
me ne el e
information precisely the sort of fact that was of crucial significance in cases like Lujan. W , supra
note 15, at 456 (emphasis in original).
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A harm-focused approach also contributes to the fragmentation of
standing, to use the term coined by Richard Fallon.86 Fallon describes a
endenc in he S eme C
anding deci i n
a d c m le ,
confusing, and irreconcilable distinctions between various types of cases,
all purportedly decided pursuant to the same three-part test for standing.
His examples primarily involve public rights and actors: challenges to
government conduct, such as cases arising under the Establishment
Clause, Equal Protection Clause, national security, challenges to agency
procedures, cases brought by governmental actors and entities, and
probability-based challenges to government conduct.87 The harm-focused
approach emerging in data-protection litigation gives rise to similar
fragmentation in disputes between private parties asserting private rights,
such as the typical data-breach case of a privacy claim against a
private enterprise.
As Fallon recognizes, a complex doctrine of standing is not necessarily
a bad thing.88 As discussed above, the best justification for standing
doctrine varies from case to case; intuitively, the question of whether a
given plaintiff may sue to stop large-scale government surveillance raises
entirely different issues than whether a plaintiff may sue to make a cable
company delete retained customer information. But hiding such
complexity behind a one-size-fits-all test and repeated invocations of
vague, high-minded concepts like the separation of powers serves no
one.89 Confusion is the inevitable result of this approach, as is
ici n
of naked, result- ien ed mani la i n. 90
Worse still, as Wu argues, shifting focus to the sufficiency of an alleged
harm usurps the role of the legislative branch,91 directly contrary to the
justification for standing doctrine invoked in most recent Supreme Court
standing jurisprudence.92 Particularly where, as in Gubala, a plaintiff sues
86. See Fallon, supra note 13, a 1070 ( B f agmen a i n, I mean he di i i n f anding la
into multiple compartments, most of which may be intelligible in themselves, but that reflect more
c nce al and n ma i e di e i han ni . ).
87. See id. at 1070 92 (collecting examples of divergent approaches to the standing inquiry).
88. See id. at 1092 ( In inci le, d c inal c m le i . . . could promote valid purposes, even if it
made knowledge of the law harder to attain. Nearly all rules are over or underinclusive when measured
against their background justifications. Without wholly eliminating over and underinclusivity, a more
complex system of rules might, under some circumstances, produce better outcomes than a simpler,
more elegant doc inal
c e. ).
89. See, e.g., id. a 1116 ( In he d main f anding la , e h ld ec gni e im lici and
elegance a ill i n . ).
90. Id. at 1094.
91. See Wu, supra note 15, at 451 (arguing that dismissal of federal statutory claims on standing
g nd hif he l c
f c n l e he de el men f he la ).
92. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) ( [By] limit[ing]
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under a federal statute, a rule rejecting standing for violation of the statute
prevents both enforcement of the statute and development of precedential
interpretation of that statute. For Wu, this represents constitutionalizing a
deregulatory agenda.93
While there is reason to believe that the current state of affairs is not so
dire,94 the implications of this change in focus are tremendous.
Developing a robust body of law inviting judges to find a plaintiff has no
standing based on a threshold, supposedly non-merits assessment of her
injury necessarily invites judges to indulge their own beliefs and biases.
For instance, in the context of constitutional litigation, it is already
apparent that Supreme Court case law develops largely from the views of
the justices on the rights in question.95 It would be in the public interest to
make that kind of outcome more difficult to reach; a focus on asserted
harms makes it far easier. Such activity is also observable in dataprotection litigation, where judicial skepticism has the potential to wreak
havoc on privacy law.96
2.

The Sufficiency of Harm

Shifting to a harm-based standing inquiry might raise less concern if
the courts could be counted on to assess harms consistently and
accurately. At least in the data-protection context, they have not done so.
Scores of cases dismissing data-protection lawsuits for perceived lack of
harm misunderstand the risks in question, fail to treat probabilistic injuries
seriously, and ignore the non-monetary harms that flow from datathe category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal
wrong . . . [ ]he la f A icle III standing . . . serves to prevent the judicial process from being used
to usurp the powers of the political b anche and c nfine he fede al c
a
e l j dicial
role. (ci a i n mi ed)).
93. See id. at 460 ( S anding bec me a mean b hich li icall de i able eg la i n i
ck
down by the courts. Whatever the merits of a deregulatory agenda, that agenda should be established,
if a all, h gh he li ical
ce . ).
94. See infra section II.A.3 (showing that federal statutory claims fare reasonably well against
standing challenges in data-protection litigation).
95. See Fallon, supra note 13, at 1095 96 ( [T]he J ice
b an i e c n i i nal ie
ine i abl d i e anding deci i n in a n mbe f im
an a ea . ); see also Nichol, supra note 13,
a 304 ( A eli e j dge
mma il de e mine hich in e e a e
h f legal c gni ance, he
n
i ingl emb ace c nce n ha
ike cl e
h me,
aining ha m ha mi
he
e e ience and edilec i n f hei
n li e . ).
96. See Wu, supra note 15, at 450. Wu argues that by throwing out cases for lack of standing where
c
ha e d b ab
he e i ence f a c gni able ha m, c
a e n nl ad ing a a ic la
perspective on the nature and value of privacy, they are shifting the law on standing to one that allows
courts to dismiss claims on the basis of their views on the nature and value of the asserted harms. That
shift will have effects far beyond the privacy cases that precipitated it. Id.
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protection violations. In doing so, they eschew reasoning that has rendered
the standing inquiry an afterthought in numerous other contexts.
a.

Underestimating the Risk of Identity Theft

Two considerations have taken on an almost talismanic nature for
federal courts assessing the risk of identity theft following a data breach:
what specific information is at issue, and whether plaintiffs have already
seen signs of identity theft. As to the latter, courts generally find that
allegations of actual identity theft suffice for standing. 97 But where a
lain iff iden i ha n
e been
len, he ecific inf ma i n
involved often decides the case.
Many courts have demanded that substantial amounts of personally
identifiable information (PII) be taken to present a substantial risk of
harm. Take SuperValu, for example. SuperValu, which operated chains of
grocery and liquor stores, suffered a data breach affecting its cash register
system at over 200 stores.98 The company allegedly employed poor
security practices, including the use of default passwords, despite the
valuable and sensitive information stored on its servers.99 The hack
compromised customer information including names, credit card
numbers, three-digit verification codes, and PINs. But the Eighth Circuit
found that plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient injury-in-fact, citing the
lack of personally identifiable information in the compromised data.100 In
he c
ie , he inf ma i n aken
ld n enable the hackers to
en ne acc n in lain iff name , and he ef e lain iff failed
plead a substantial risk of harm.101
Focusing on PII does have intuitive appeal. An allegation that a

97. See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 772 (8th Cir. 2017) ( [P]lain iff H lme allege
a present injury in fact to support his standing. He alleges that he suffered a fraudulent charge on the
credit card he previously used to make a purchase at one f defendan
e affec ed b he da a
b eache . ).
98. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Supervalu Discloses a Data Breach, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/16/technology/food-retailer-discloses-a-data-breach.html
[https://perma.cc/8ZVW-L8QL] (reporting that breach affected 180 SuperValu stores and 29
franchised stores).
99. See SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 766.
100. See id. a 770 ( Ini iall , e n e ha he allegedl
len Ca d Inf ma i n d e n incl de
an e nall iden if ing inf ma i n, ch a cial ec i n mbe , bi h da e , d i e licen e
n mbe . ).
101. Id. ( [P]
an
he fac al e idence elied n in he c m lain , he e i li le n i k ha
anyone will use the Card Information stolen in these data breaches to open unauthorized accounts in
he lain iff name , hich i he e f iden i hef gene all c n ide ed ha e a m e ha mf l
di ec effec n c n me . (ci a i n mi ed)).
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defendant has allowed bad actors to obtain PII suggests that the plaintiff
is at high risk of identity theft the bad actor has all the information they
need
b ain c edi in he lain iff name
he i e im e na e he
plaintiff.
But it is not true, as cases like SuperValu hold, that loss of less or
different information means a plaintiff is not at risk. Information does not
exist in a vacuum. Researchers have for decades demonstrated that
supposedly non-identifying information can be aggregated, analyzed, and
reidentified. Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove, for instance, discuss the
e am le f AOL 2006 elea e f en milli n ea ch e ie ha
AOL had fully anonymized users were described only by a number.102
Researchers nevertheless were able to identify the person behind the
number in many cases simply by collating searches.103 Paul Ohm provides
an he b acing e am le: How many other people in the United States
share your specific combination of ZIP code, birth date (including year),
and sex? According to a landmark study, for 87 percent of the American
population, the answer is zero; these three pieces of information uniquely
iden if each f hem. 104 One recent study found that reidentification
becomes possible given only a few attributes, and that access to fifteen
demographic attributes would uniquely identify 99.98% of individuals.105
To focus on the completeness of PII lost in a data breach is therefore
too narrow, and, indeed, it is emblematic of what Schwartz and Solove
ha e called he PII
blem, 106 as it overemphasizes particular types and
groupings of information. Again, SuperValu proves instructive. Even
c n ide ing he l
inf ma i n in i la i n, he c
finding eem
intuitively odd. But it is even harder to reconcile when combined with the
fact that modern data thieves often have access to other troves of
information including names, social security numbers, and dates of birth.
102. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of
Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1841 (2011) (discussing examples of
users identified from f ll an n mi ed ea ch queries).
103. Id.
104. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705 (2010) (a g ing ha eiden ifica i n
nd[ ] he
dea h knell f he idea ha e
ec i ac hen e em e PII f m
da aba e ).
105. Luc Rocher, Julien M. Hendrickx & Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Estimating the Success of
Re-identifications in Incomplete Datasets Using Generative Models, NATURE COMMC NS, July 23,
2019, a 5 (n ing ha [ ] e l , fi , h
ha fe a ib e a e f en fficien
e-identify
with high confidence individuals in heavily incomplete datasets and, second, reject the claim that
sampling or releasing partial datasets, e.g., from one hospital network or a single online service,
ide la ible deniabili ).
106. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 102 (arguing for a new theoretical approach to PII accounting
for the malleability of information).
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Aggregation of that data with the information lost in the SuperValu breach
gives the thieves everything they need to perpetrate identity theft on a
massive scale. The risk to the plaintiffs in any given data breach is thus
much higher than is stated by those courts that narrowly focus their
inquiry into harm.
b.

Economic Harm and Probabilistic Injuries

Speculative and inaccurate judicial estimation of the risk of harm is
particularly galling because there is no textual or logical basis for such a
practice.107 The S eme C
anding j i
dence clea l
establishes that the bar for monetary loss to constitute injury-in-fact is
incredibly low, if it exists at all.108 Yet courts still demand increasingly
higher risk of harm in order to find standing based on a possible future
injury.
It is therefore troubling that the federal courts do not meaningfully
engage the concept of expected value in assessing the existence of an
Article III harm in data-protection litigation. Expected value is an
economic concept used widely in law, economics, psychology and other
fields to neatly estimate the value of a future harm by multiplying the size
of the harm by the probability that it will occur.109 Others have discussed
how expected value might be used in lawsuits to assess harm. Jonathan
Nash notes, for example, that mortality risks of 1 in 100,000 would suffice
for a showing of injury in fact.110 While the consequences that flow from
a privacy harm may not typically include death, and the probability that
they will occur is not susceptible to easy calculation, even a rudimentary
calculation of expected value would seem to establish the existence of a
harm in a typical data-protection case.111 For example, a 2014 study by
107. See Hessick, supra note 15, at 65 (noting that Article III does not distinguish between low
i k f ha m and high i k f ha m ); see also id. a 67 (a g ing ha [ ]ha hi mean i ha all
claims based on risk of injury present an actual case or controversy, no matter how small the risk. So
l ng a (1) he challenged ac i i inc ea e he lain iff i k f ffe ing ha m and (2) a j dicial
order could stop the challenged activity, thereby removing the increased risk of harm, courts should
have Article III j i dic i n hea he claim ).
108. See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (noting
ha [f]
anding
e,al
f e en a mall am n f m ne i
dina il an inj
);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 31 (1961) (finding plaintiffs who were fined five dollars
each had standing); see also Carpenters Indus. Council v. Zinke, 854 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(h lding ha [a] d lla f ec n mic ha m i ill an inj -in-fac f
anding
e ).
109. See, e.g., Nash, supra note 15, at 1306 (proposing an expected-value test for standing where
an
i i e e ec ed al e
ld ffice and defining an e ec ed al e e a multiplying the
magni de f he ha m b i
babili ).
110. Id.
111. Although those courts that have engaged in something approximating such an inquiry have
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the Department of Justice found that the average loss for a victim of
identity theft amounted to $1,343.112 Even a 1/1000 risk of identity theft
in the wake of a data breach would establish an expected loss of more than
one dollar, the actual loss of which courts in other contexts have held
sufficient for standing purposes.113
Furthermore, as Nash argues, the risk of harm creates present economic
effects;114 that is, risks of harm inflict present injuries separate from the
expected value of that future harm. The paradigmatic example is the
existence of insurance individuals and businesses alike pay relatively
small amounts in the present to cover themselves from incurring larger
costs in the event of future harm.115 In the data-protection context, news
of a data breach might lead an affected customer to purchase credit
monitoring, or to undertake the time-consuming and costly process of
changing any affected information such as her social security number or
credit card information.116 These are real, present economic harms that
result from data breaches. That a single dollar of economic harm suffices
for injury-in-fact in other contexts reveals troubling exceptionalism in
data-protection litigation.
c.

Non-Economic Harm

In any event, injury-in-fact is not limited to economic harm. The
Supreme Court has long held that non-economic interests may support
standing, specifically identifying aesthetic, conservational, recreational,
and spiritual interests as potentially supporting standing.117 Datanot done the inquiry credit. See, for example, the Beck Court s determination that a 33% chance that
affected plaintiffs would suffer identity theft meant that it was more likely than not that a given
plaintiff would not be harmed, thus precluding standing. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275
76 (4th Cir. 2017).
112. See Cody Gredler, The Real Cost of Identity Theft, CSID (Sept. 9, 2016),
https://www.csid.com/2016/09/real-cost-identity-theft/ [https://perma.cc/C5DM-G8FE].
113. See Carpenters Indus. Council, 854 F.3d at 5.
114. Nash, supra note 15, at 1325.
115. Id. at 1326 ( Indeed, indi id al f en ac
b i e c en ec n mic c f f
e risk.
Consider the institution of insurance: people who insure against risks pay current dollars as the
insurance premium. In return, they will be reimbursed for (at least most of) the costs of the future
ha m in ed again . ).
116. Federal courts have explicitly refused to take such costs into account in determining whether
lain iff ha e ffe ed ha m, deeming he e inj ie
elf-im ed. Beck, 848 F.3d at 276 77
(collecting cases).
117. See A n f Da a P ce ing Se . O g ., Inc. . Cam , 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); see also
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 63 (1992) ( Of c
e, he de i e
e
b e e an
animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purposes of
anding. ).
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protection litigation implicates a variety of non-economic harms that
courts have been hesitant to embrace.
The obvious non-economic harms flowing from a data breach are
increased risk of identity theft and anxiety about the fallout of the data
breach. Citron and Solove persuasively argue that these are real harms that
ought to suffice for standing purposes,118 as they have sufficed in other
contexts. Increased risk of future harm, for example, has been found
compensable in the medical malpractice and environmental law
contexts.119 That these types of harms suffice in those contexts is
unsurprising given the strongest underlying purpose of standing doctrine
in private-rights cases: ensuring that the litigants have sufficient interest
and adversity to frame the issues in dispute. So, too, in the data-protection
context. A plaintiff whose information has been stolen incurs increased
risk of identity theft and possibly present costs to ameliorate the risk. Such
a plaintiff has a clear interest in obtaining redress. The defendant has a
concomitant interest in avoiding liability.
The larger harm, however, is anxiety. It is hard to envision a creditmonitoring solution so robust that a person whose information has been
stolen need never think about identity theft again, to say nothing of data
breaches that involve the loss of intimate or embarrassing information.120
Surveys of data-breach victims confirm this intuition. For example, one
survey of victims of the 2017 Equifax data breach found that nearly 90%
f e nden e e ienced ad e e feeling
em i n , and 81% f
that group reported feeling anxiety as a result of the breach.121
It should be beyond dispute that this anxiety is a cognizable harm.
Courts rejecting it in data-protection cases run counter to recognition of
anxiety as sufficient harm in other cases. Ryan Calo notes the
in e en ial e am le f he
f a a l where the harm is the
emotion of fear . . . . 122 Citron and Solove catalog other torts premised
on pure emotional distress, including alienation of affection, breach of
confidentiality, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress,
118. See, e.g., Solove & Citron, supra note 15, at 744 45 ( Ri k and an ie a e inj ie in he he e
and n . ).
119. Id. at 761 62 (discussing contexts in which courts have found future harm compensable).
120. See id. at 764 65 (discussing fallout from data breach at a website used to arrange adulterous
relationships, including the suicides of multiple individuals affected).
121. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., EQUIFAX ONE YEAR LATER: AFTERMATH REPORT 2018, at 1, 4
(2018), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ITRC_Equifax-BreachAftermath-Report-2018-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9HQ-2SNS] (reporting that victims of identity theft
experience emotions ch a fea ega ding hei e nal financial ec i
feeling a sense of
hel le ne ).
122. Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361, 363 (2014).
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and the privacy torts themselves.123 It is no longer controversial that these
torts are redressable in court. Yet courts do not take analogous injuries in
data-protection cases seriously, often preferring instead to concoct
distinctions with no basis in logic or precedent.124
To the extent courts have dismissed anxiety stemming from privacy
harms as too difficult to calculate, they again depart from settled rules in
other contexts. Julie Cohen notes the backflips that courts are willing to
perform in order to quantify damages in intellectual-property lawsuits.125
And in any event, whether the harm is difficult to calculate goes to the
issue of remedies, not standing.
Standing is vital in ensuring the constitutional role and proper
functioning of the federal judiciary. Tying together various strains of
scholarship helps to identify examples of federal courts drifting from the
history and purpose of the doctrine in data-protection litigation. However,
the focus on a relative handful of Supreme Court and appellate cases
leaves unclear the extent of the potential problem. That narrow focus also
makes it more difficult to identify potential causes and solutions. Part II
takes the next step by surveying a broader landscape of standing
challenges in data-protection cases in an effort to understand how
widespread the problem has become and determine why the courts
have drifted.
II.

EXPLORING ERROR

Existing literature makes several important contributions in identifying
errors and discrepancies in leading data-protection cases. But these
piecemeal analyses cannot reveal whether there are systemic pressures
behind the errors, and therefore are limited in what solutions they
can propose.
This Part shows that systemic problems drive erroneous decisions on
standing in data-protection litigation. Through analysis of hand-collected
and hand-coded data derived from 217 decisions in these types of cases,
this Part identifies a variety of factors leading to the aberrant decisions on
standing in data-protection litigation discussed in Part I. While some of
123. Solove & Citron, supra note 15, at 768 73 (discussing development of legal redress for
anxiety).
124. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 46 (3d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing medical
mal ac ice and
ic
ca e f m da a b each beca e he e i n
an ifiable i k f damage in
he f
e and h e ca e hinge[] n h man heal h c nce n ).
125. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 542 (noting, inter alia, that in copyright and patent infringement
cases, courts a ign damages based on hypothesized reasonable licensing fees for imagined
an ac i n ;
i men
f licen ing a e f na cen
n ne i en ma ke ; and de e mine he
profits attributable to infringing activity by means of arithmetically convenient fic i n ).
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these explanations such as path dependence are relatively innocuous,
others lend support to the view that federal courts are engaged in
inappropriate policy- and preference-based decision-making.
Section II.A describes the methodology employed to assemble and
code the data set underlying this Part. Section II.B presents empirical
findings from the 217 cases included in the data set and the most direct
explanations for erroneous decisions that arise from the data, including
overreliance on Clapper and failure to proceed from the appropriate
justification for standing. Section II.C discusses other potential
explanations that find support in the case law and in existing scholarship
across a number of fields, most worrying among them evidence of
preference-based decisions.
A.

Methodology

1.

Selection of Cases

To assemble the data set analyzed in this Article, I conducted multiple
searches of the Westlaw database of all federal cases decided between
February 26, 2013, (the date on which the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Clapper) and the end of 2019. Cases were identified via two
search strings, designed to be fairly overinclusive: 1) op((data /p privacy)
& standing); and 2) op((data /p breach) & standing).126 In total, these
searches returned 2,056 results.127 I then manually reviewed each case to
determine if the decision dealt with a challenge to standing to assert a
data-protection claim that is, a claim involving alleged wrongful
collection or disclosure of private information.128 Of the 2,056 cases
reviewed, 217 fit those criteria.129 I conducted substantially all of the
analysis on a subset of 209 cases after discarding eight cases in which
courts reached mixed results on standing.
126. Thus, search one would return all federal cases that included the words data and privacy
in the same paragraph, and that also included the word standing anywhere in the opinion. The op
operator restricts the search to the text of the opinion itself, thus excluding Westlaw s proprietary
editorial Headnotes.
127. The total number of results is reached by conducting one omnibus search that captures the
results from both searches.
128. While I construed data-protection claims broadly, I excluded certain types of claims that fell
just beyond the scope of wrongful collection or disclosure of private information, although nominally
asserting privacy claims. The most frequent type of claim excluded at this edge was for unsolicited
telephone calls to plaintiffs in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. See Hale v.
Creditors Relief LLC, No. 17-2447, 2018 WL 2539080 (D.N.J. June 4, 2018).
129. The most frequent types of false positives in the search results include motions to suppress
evidence in criminal proceedings and decisions in all types of cases using the rhetorical phrase
standing alone. See Doe v. Compact Info. Sys., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-5013-M, 2015 WL 11022761, at
*5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015).
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Case Coding

I reviewed all cases fitting the selection criteria and hand-coded each
on a variety of issues, including:
Court;
Judge;
Decision date;
Claims asserted;
Whether the case involved a data breach;
Formulation of standing doctrine;
Standing outcome;
Merits outcome, if present;
Citation to Clapper; and
Citation to Spokeo.130
Across all 217 cases, I identified eighty-three distinct types of claims
asserted f e am le, negligence, i la i n f Ne Y k Gene al
Business Law, violation of the federal Stored Communications Act, and
violation of the right to privacy under the California Constitution. I then
assigned each type of claim to one of fourteen second-level categories
for example, negligence is a non-privacy tort and violation of the Stored
Communications Act is a federal wiretap claim. Finally, I assigned each
type of claim to one of five high-level categories based on its second-level
category for example, grouping together all common-law claims and all
federal statutory claims.
3.

Description of the Data Set

The data set includes decisions from fifty-eight different federal courts,
authored by 148 different judges.131 In total, district court opinions
account for 177 decisions in the data set, with the remaining thirty-two
coming from the courts of appeals. The number of cases decided in each
year analyzed varies significantly:

130. As a check on coding accuracy, a research assistant independently coded a subset of sixtythree cases on these same issues. I measured coding reliability using Cohen s kappa, finding a high
deg ee f imila i in c ding ac
he ke mea e f anding
c me ( = 0.936), ci a i n
Clapper ( = 0.935), and e ence f a da a b each ( = 1), a ell a n he e alen f m la i n
of standing doctrine, case or controversy ( = 0.904) and ab ence f a ed f m la i n ( = 0.967).
131. This figure excludes the five per curiam appellate decisions included in the dataset.
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Table 1:
Breakdown of Cases by Year
Year
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
4.

Number of Cases
14
16
24
37
45
40
33

Limitations of the Data Set

While the data set is reasonably comprehensive, it is not without
limitations. As a starting point, it is limited to decisions present in the
Westlaw database, which may not include every decision from every
federal court. Analysis of the decisions of appellate courts may be skewed
by exogenous selection effects, namely, that a district c
denial f a
motion to dismiss for lack of standing is not immediately appealable.
Similarly, analysis of particular district courts may be skewed by
lain iff f m-shopping behavior certain early circuit court opinions
may have incentivized plaintiffs to bring claims in district courts governed
by relatively friendly circuit decisions.
B.

Findings

At least in the context of data-protection litigation, the federal courts
appear to have lost sight of the purpose of standing doctrine. That
conclusion is supported by multiple findings that emerge from the data.
Most significant among those findings is that the courts rely too heavily
on Clapper and tend to find no standing when relying on Clapper. Other
end a a en in he da a incl de he c
marked tendency not to
expressly discuss the purpose of the standing inquiry, disparate results
depending on the type of claim asserted, and substantial jurisdictional
variations in the adjudication of standing challenges.
1.

Citation to Clapper Correlates with Denial of Standing

Clapper has little to do with data protection by private entities NSA
communications interception at a massive scale in the name of national
security implicates a host of concerns that do not arise when private

Haley (Do Not Delete)

2020]

10/11/2020 6:24 PM

DATA PROTECTION IN DISARRAY

1221

entities obtain or lose control of private information. That has not stopped
it from becoming the go-to Supreme Court precedent for lower courts
grappling with challenges to standing in data-protection litigation. Indeed,
nearly all the major appellate cases discussed in this Article engage
extensively with Clapper.132 In doing so, the courts of appeals ingrained
the idea that Clapper ha h a e men f f
e ha m in he anding
inquiry should be applied wholesale in data-protection litigation. District
courts followed suit, regularly relying on Clapper in discussing dataprotection standing, and particularly when denying standing.
The data on this point bear emphasis. Of 209 standing decisions in dataprotection litigation issued after Clapper, 103 (49.3%) cite Clapper. Of
those 103 cases, sixty-six (64%) find the plaintiffs lack standing. In 2016,
the peak year for Clapper citations, sixteen out of twenty-four (67%)
decisions citing Clapper denied standing.133 Regression analysis confirms
the presence of a negative correlation between citation to Clapper and
findings on standing.134 The effect is much more pronounced in the district
courts, with 69% of district court decisions citing Clapper finding
plaintiffs lack standing, compared to only 37.5% of appellate decisions
citing Clapper.135

132. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262
(4th Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App x 384 (6th Cir. 2016); In re
SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688
(7th Cir. 2015). Only Gubala and Reilly do not discuss Clapper, and the latter by virtue of the fact
that it predates Clapper. Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017); Reilly v.
Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).
133. 2015 proved to be the most challenging year for plaintiffs confronted with Clapper-citing
courts: 82% of the seventeen decisions that year denied standing. By way of comparison, 86% of
decisions not citing Clapper that year found standing.
134. When evaluated as the sole predictor of standing, citation to Clapper is significantly
negatively correlated with standing (p < .001). When evaluated alongside a large group of other
predictors (whether a case involves a data breach, standing formulation, and intermediate-category
claim type), the negative correlation remains significant (p < .001).
135. Although appellate courts, like district courts, found standing less frequently when citing
Clapper, the relationship is not statistically significant.
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Figure 1:
Standing Outcome in Cases Citing Clapper

Many courts explicitly, but wrongly, contend that Clapper must be
applied in data-protection cases. The Fourth Circuit in Beck, for example,
declared that Clapper di c i n f hen a h ea ened inj
constitutes an Article III injury-in-fac i c n lling he e 136 but that is
not correct. To the contrary, there is every reason to treat Clapper as at
most persuasive in a data-protection case between private parties, given
its unique context of a constitutional challenge to a statutory scheme
enacted in the name of national security.137 Courts have substantial leeway
in determining what, exactly, constitutes binding precedent in a given
case.138 Recalling the purposes of standing doctrine illuminates the
136. Beck, 848 F.3d at 272.
137. In one thorough examination of Clapper ele ance, J dge K h ejec ed he n i n ha
Clapper e e en he ea change ha [defendan ] gge . In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Priv. Litig., 66
F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Judge Koh reached that conclusion by observing that
Clapper did not change the law governing Article III standing. The Supreme Court did not overrule
any precedent, nor did it reformulate the familiar standing requirements of injury-in-fact, causation,
and redressability. . . . Moreover, Clapper di c i n f anding a e in he en i i e c n e
fa
claim that other branches of government were violating the Constitution, and the U.S. Supreme Court
itself noted tha i
anding anal i a n all ig
a a e l . Id. at 1213 14 (citing
Cla e . Amne In l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013)).
138. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
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blem. The S eme C
ea ning in Clapper proceeds from the
separation-of-powers rationale for standing. That rationale has no
application in data-protection cases like Beck. Only by ignoring that
discrepancy or its import can a court proclaim that Clapper
directly controls.
The data also show the existence of another path. The overall citation
rate for Clapper, while high (49%), does not suggest that the courts
uniformly believe it necessary to apply in data-protection cases. And just
as citations to Clapper correlate with findings of no standing, of the 106
cases studied that do not cite Clapper, 72.6% find standing exists.139
Simply put, nothing about Clapper requires federal courts to dismiss dataprotection cases for lack of standing, but too often the courts have chosen
the wrong path.140
Figure 2:
Standing Outcome in Cases Not Citing Clapper

Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 101, 123 24 (2001) ( Wha c n i e eceden
in a particular case is a flexible concept that is subject to interpretation, especially when considering
cases that are not directly on point. In practice, courts may interpret a prior decision in such a way
that it does not appear to be controlling, even though a strong argument might be made that it is
relevant and controlling precedent. Courts may also do the opposite, citing a preceding case as
controlling or persuasive precedent when that case is arguably not relevant to the issue at hand.
Furthermore, courts may intentionally emphasize some facts and deemphasize others to make a case
appear controlling or not, depending on the de i ed e l . (footnotes omitted)).
139. Here again, the appellate courts were more solicitous, finding standing in 87.5% of cases not
citing Clapper, compared to only 70% of district court cases.
140. That said, the data give some reason to hope for improvement: citations to Clapper in dataprotection cases have declined since 2016.
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Failure to Consider the Purpose of Standing Doctrine

Another factor potentially leading to standing dismissals in dataprotection litigation is the failure of courts to grapple with the appropriate
justification for standing doctrine as they conduct the inquiry. In his
concurrence in Spokeo, Justice Thomas acknowledged that the standing
inquiry should be different depending on whether public or private rights
are at issue in the case.141 In particular, he recognized that the separation
of powers is not implicated when plaintiffs allege a violation of private
rights, and that in private-rights cases a lain iff need n allege ac al
ha m be nd he in a i n f ha
i a e igh . 142 Data-protection
lawsuits are private-rights actions and should typically survive
standing challenges.
Nonetheless, the data suggest that federal courts are not employing this
approach, which helps account for why only 55% of the cases studied
survived challenges to standing. Analysis of how federal courts justify
application of standing doctrine in these cases yields troubling results. By
far the most common justification relied on by the courts in these
decisions is mere invocation of Article III
efe ence
Ca e
C n
e ie . 143 That clause of Article III is the textual hook for
anding d c ine e i ence but provides no guidance about the purpose
f he d c ine. Ye 118 f he 209 (56%) ca e
died in ked Ca e
C n
e ie a j ifica i n f
anding d c ine e i ence,
ih
an f he anal i
di c i n f anding
e. Worse,
the second-most common justification found in the cases was the absence
of justification: in eighty-five cases (41%), the court merely stated and
applied the three-part test for standing.
Courts are not, of course, required to recite the justification for every
doctrine they apply. That said, it is striking that in 187 out of 209 (89%)
cases studied, courts effectively declined to expressly engage with the
justifications for a case-ending, constitutional doctrine as they applied
it.144 Equally striking, the justification with the most relevance to dataprotection litigation the necessity of adversarial presentation of the

141. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 54 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(analyzing the public/private rights distinction in standing doctrine).
142. Id. at 1553.
143. See, e.g., In re LinkedIn User Priv. Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ( An
Article III federal court must ask whether a plaintiff has suffered sufficient injury
a i f he ca e
c n
e
e i emen f A icle III f he U.S. C n i i n. ).
144. Sixteen of the 118 cases citing Cases or Controversies as a justification for standing
doctrine also discuss another justification and are thus excluded from this statement.
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issues appears in only four cases (1.9%).145
3.

Inconsistent Treatment of Different Types of Claims

The data also reveal discrepancies in standing outcome depending on
the types of claim asserted. Standing is, supposedly, a non-merits inquiry.
The ecific f m la i n f a lain iff claim i n a fac in he h eepart test. Indeed, courts have developed a distinct doctrine of statutory
standing that addresses whether a plaintiff with Article III standing
nevertheless falls outside the zone of interest a statute is meant
to address.146
Yet the data show a substantial difference in standing determinations
based on the type of claim being asserted and the source of the injury in
question. Claims involving data breaches offer a striking example. Of the
209 cases with definitive rulings on standing analyzed, ninety-four arose
from a data breach. Courts found that these data breach plaintiffs had
standing in only 47% of cases, compared to an overall standing rate of
61% in non-data-breach cases. This discrepancy is, unsurprisingly,
magnified by the Clapper effect. Of the eighty data-breach decisions,
seventy-two cite Clapper, and only 37.5% of those cases find standing.

145. Although such a small sample size is not statistically significant, it is interesting to note that
courts found standing existed in three (75%) of these cases. All four of these decisions came from
district courts. See Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding
standing); Ruk v. Crown Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 16-CV-3444-LMM, 2017 WL 3085282, at *1 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 22, 2017) (finding standing); Oneal v. First Tenn. Bank, No. 17-CV-3-SKL, 2018 WL
1352519, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2018) (dismissing for lack of standing); Gordon v. Chipotle
Mexican Grill, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1239 (D. Colo. 2018) (finding standing).
146. See, e.g., Lexmark Int l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 & n.4
(2014) (noting that the inquiry whether a lain iff fall i hin he cla
f lain iff h m C ng e
ha a h i ed
e i
me ime called
a
anding and i
ea ed . . . as effectively
j i dic i nal ).
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Figure 3:
Cases Arising from Data Breaches

Similar discrepancies emerge when looking at the types of claims
asserted. At a high level of generality, three categories of claims are most
common in data-protection cases: state statutory (136 cases), common law
(126 cases), and federal statutory (94 cases).147 Even at this level of
generality, there are stark differences. State statutory claims fared the
worst courts found standing in only 54% of cases asserting causes of
action based on state statutes. The common law fared slightly better, with
courts finding standing in 56% of cases asserting a common-law cause of
action. Plaintiffs asserting claims based on federal statutes fared best, with
courts finding standing in 63% of cases.148
These high-level discrepancies can be explained to some extent by
more granular examination of the claims asserted. For example, plaintiffs
147. Remaining high-level categories of claims were rarely asserted: state constitutional (eleven
cases) and federal constitutional (five cases). In three cases, the nature of plaintiffs claims was not
apparent from the opinion.
148. Regression analysis confirms a positive correlation between presence of a federal statutory
claim and a finding of standing (p < .05). No statistically significant correlation was found with
respect to state statutory or common law claims.
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asserting federal wiretap claims were very successful: courts found
standing in 87% of cases asserting violations of the Wiretap Act or the
Stored Communications Act.149 But only two cases in the entire data set
involved assertion of a state-law wiretap claim.150
Figure 4:
Standing by Claim Category

Plaintiffs suing under privacy statutes did not fare as well, further
supporting the notion that judges are skeptical about privacy harms. Only
62% of cases involving claims under state privacy statutes were permitted
to proceed, well ahead of the 52% of federal privacy claims in which
courts found standing.
Of note, the most prevalent category of statutory claims was also the
least successful: consumer protection. Just 50% of the ninety-six decisions
involving state-law consumer protection claims found standing; for
federal consumer protection claims, that number creeps up only to 54% in
149. Here, too, regression analysis confirms a positive correlation between presence of a federal
wiretap claim and a finding of standing (p < .05).
150. See In re Google Inc., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2013);
Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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fifty cases.151
More detailed examination reveals interesting variation. The most
common type of consumer protection claim i la i n f Calif nia
Unfair Competition Law (UCL), an act with strict statutory standing
requirements fared relatively well: courts found standing existed in 60%
of the forty-three cases asserting UCL claims.152 The most common
federal consumer protection claim violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act was less successful, with courts finding standing in 55% of thirtythree cases. The biggest loser among federal consumer protection claims
were claims under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
(FACTA) only 38% of the thirteen cases asserting such claims survived
a standing challenge.
Figure 5:
Standing by Claim

151. A negative correlation between presence of a state consumer-protection claim and finding of
standing exists in the data (p < .05).
152. This level of success may be attributable at least in part due to the courts hearing the claims:
thirty-five of the forty-three cases asserting UCL claims were heard in California s district courts, and
one was heard in the Ninth Circuit.
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Finally, three major types of common-law claims appear in the cases:
privacy torts, non-privacy torts (typically negligence), and other claims
(such as breach of contract). Privacy tort claims were both most successful
and least-often asserted: 72% of the twenty-nine cases asserting privacy
torts were permitted to go forward.153 The other categories fell below the
overall standing rate of 54% in all cases analyzed (52% for non-privacy
torts and 51% for other common-law claims).
This empirical analysis supports many of the ideas advanced in Part I.
Low standing rates in data breach cases suggest that federal courts are
unduly skeptical of the risk of harm flowing from data breaches,
particularly in the aftermath of Clapper. The c
ke ici m
ld
also account for the relatively low rate of standing in non-privacy tort
cases. Judicial skepticism about harm also appears to be borne out by the
relatively low rates of standing in cases asserting statutory privacy and
consumer protection claims. It is telling, for instance, that courts
dismissed a large majority of FACTA claims for lack of standing. Among
other things, FACTA instructs retailers not to print more than the last five
digi f a e n c edi
debi ca d n mbe n a ecei .154 For reasons
passing understanding, many retailers appear to be in breach of that
requirement.155 Congress explicitly adjudged that printing more than the
last five digits of a card number presented a risk to consumers, and enacted
FACTA with the intended purpose of helping to combat identity
hef . 156 Yet most federal courts to confront the issue have substituted
hei
n ie
f ha m f C ng e , finding allega i n f FACTA
i la i n in fficien l c nc e e
imminen
anding.157
Conversely, where plaintiffs sue under statutes, and particularly federal
statutes, that more strongly imply culpable behavior by defendants, courts
find standing more often federal wiretap and Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA) claims stand as by far the most successful.158 These
types of framing differences should, in theory, have no impact on the
standing analysis. That they do confirms judicial misapplication of
the doctrine.
153. Privacy tort claims in non-data-breach cases were particularly successful, with a standing rate
of 88%. In data-breach cases, privacy torts fared less well, but still better than data-breach cases not
involving privacy tort claims (54% vs. 47%).
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1).
155. See, e.g., Taylor v. Fred s, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1254 (N.D. Ala. 2018) ( [The
plaintiff] . . . ecei ed a ecei ha di la ed he fi
i digi and he la f
digi f [ hei ] debi
ca d. ).
156. Id. (quoting Wood v. J Choo USA, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2016)).
157. See id. at 1258 71.
158. Only two of the cases analyzed asserted state law wiretap claims, but it is interesting to note
that courts found standing in both.
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Jurisdictional Variations

If uniform application of the law is a goal of the federal judicial system,
data-protection cases show the courts falling well short. The data reveal
substantial variation in approach and adjudication at the district level.
Given that data-protection cases typically involve technology
companies and online services, it is unsurprising that the Northern District
of California is the leading venue for data-protection cases, issuing thirtyseven decisions on standing in such cases since Clapper. The court has
also proven reasonably plaintiff-friendly, finding standing in twenty-five
of those thirty-seven cases (68%).159 The second most frequent venue, the
Northern District of Illinois, has been much less solicitous, finding
standing in only six of eighteen cases (33%) analyzed. Reliance on
Clapper is a significant point of distinction between these districts: the
California court cited Clapper in only twelve of the thirty-seven (32%)
data-protection cases analyzed, while the Illinois court cited it in eleven
out of eighteen (61%).
Figure 6:
Cases by Court

159. The large number of cases in the Northern District of California yields the only two judges
issuing five or more opinions on standing in data-protection cases. Judge Koh leads the way with nine
decisions; in light of her thorough analysis of Clapper in In re Adobe Systems, it is no surprise that
she found standing existed in eight (89%) of these cases. Judge Davila, by contrast, found standing in
only two of seven (29%) of the cases he decided.

Haley (Do Not Delete)

2020]

10/11/2020 6:24 PM

DATA PROTECTION IN DISARRAY

1231

No other courts appear nearly so frequently in the data, but interesting
trends emerge from the handful of repeat players. For example, among
courts issuing five or more decisions on standing in data-protection cases
since Clapper, most tend strongly in one direction or another on the
question of standing. On the one end, in addition to the Northern District
of California, both the Northern District of Georgia and Southern District
of New York have been friendlier to plaintiffs, finding standing in seven
of eight and nine cases, respectively, while the Seventh Circuit found
standing in six of seven cases and the Third Circuit found standing in all
five cases it decided. At the other end, the District of Columbia outdid the
Northern District of Illinois, finding standing in none of the six cases it
decided.160 This tendency perhaps exemplifies the role of path dependence
in individual courts.
C.

Contributing Causes

The data show that a number of factors Clapper, justification for
standing, etc. are directly correlated with federal courts dismissing data
protection cases at the standing stage. In addition to the direct correlations
found in the data, this Article demonstrates numerous potential
contributing factors that find support in the data, case law, and other
scholarship. Leading factors include path dependence, the policy
preferences of judges, and simple ignorance.
1.

Path Dependence

The above data analysis strongly suggests harmful path dependence is
at work in data-protection cases. At its most basic level, path dependence
is the notion that earlier decisions constrain future decisions.161 Path
dependence is a defining feature of a common-law system: previous
decisions of the higher courts are binding on future decisions of the lower
courts. Past decisions, even when not binding, are given persuasive effect
in present cases. And stare decisis counsels that courts should stick to the
path if reasonably possible.
The system has built-in drawbacks, among them that the first decisions
on a given issue are disproportionately impactful and that it therefore
160. A handful of courts deciding five or more cases were more varied in determining standing:
the Central District of California and the District of New Jersey (both, three of eight), the District of
Minnesota (two of five), and the Southern District of California and the Ninth Circuit (both, three of
five).
161. Hathaway, supra note 138, at 103 04 (defining path dependence as the idea that an
c me
or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the hi ical a h leading i ).
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incentivizes races to the courthouse.162 These issues may well be at play
in the data-protection context. In data-protection litigation, some of those
early choices raise serious concerns, effectively poisoning subsequent
development in the doctrine. The direct and largely unquestioned adoption
of Clapper in the data-protection context is a ready example. Another
fascinating example is found in a line of cases in the Northern District of
Illin i in l ing Illin i Bi me ic Inf ma i n P i ac Ac (BIPA) ha
emerges from a troublingly non-adversarial context.
BIPA is a (for now) unique statute. As explained by the Illinois
Supreme Court, BIPA
imposes numerous restrictions on how private entities collect,
retain, disclose and destroy biometric identifiers, including retina
or iris scans, fingerprints, voiceprints, scans of hand or face
geometry, or biometric information. Under the Act, any person
agg ie ed b a i la i n f i
i i n hall ha e a igh f
ac i n again an ffending a
and ma ec e f each
i la i n he g ea e f li idated damages or actual damages,
reasonable attorney fees and costs, and any other relief, including
an injunction, that the court deems appropriate.163
In recent years, it has apparently become commonplace for employers
to use fingerprinting systems for time-tracking: rather than clocking in
and out with a punch card, ID, or the like, employees use their fingerprints.
Man f he e em l e ha e n heeded BIPA n ice and di cl
e
requirements, leading to a wave of putative class-action lawsuits. Such
lawsuits have led to a series of decisions from the Northern District of
Illinois on standing, including, chronologically, the McCollough v.
Smarte Carte, Inc.,164 Howe v. Speedway LLC,165 Dixon v. Washington &
Jane Smith Community Beverly, 166 Goings v. UGN, Inc.,167 Aguilar v.
Rexnord LLC,168 Johnson v. United Air Lines, Inc.,169 Miller v.
Southwestern Airlines Co.,170 McGinnis v. United States Cold Storage,

162. Id. a 105 (n ing ha c
ea l e l i n f legal i e can bec me l cked-in and
e i an
change and ha he de in hich ca e a i e in he c
can ignifican l affec he
ecific legal d c ine ha l ima el e l ).
163. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1199 200.
164. No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016).
165. No. 17-cv-07303, 2018 WL 2445541 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018).
166. No. 17 C 8033, 2018 WL 2445292 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018).
167. No. 17-cv-9340, 2018 WL 2966970 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2018).
168. No. 17 CV 9019, 2018 WL 3239715 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2018).
169. No. 17 C 08858, 2018 WL 3636556 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2018).
170. No. 18 C 86, 2018 WL 4030590 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2018).
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Inc.,171 and Colon v. Dynacast, LLC cases.172
Over the course of these nine cases, the judges of the Northern District
reached a loose rule for whether these allegations support standing: where,
as in Dixon and Miller, the plaintiffs alleged that the employers disclosed
fingerprint scans to third parties (usually payroll vendors), the plaintiffs
alleged a sufficiently concrete injury for Article III purposes. In the
remaining cases, which featured no allegations of disclosure, the courts
declined to find standing. One of the later cases in the line, McGinnis,
neatly mma i e he in : All he c
in hi Di ic ha ha e
considered whether a person suffers a concrete injury from the known
collection and retention of a fingerprint, without disclosure to a thirdparty, have answered the question n . 173
Whether this distinction is correct174 is of secondary importance to how
it was reached. At first blush, this is an ordinary series of cases in one
district raising similar issues, with judges appropriately taking cues from
each he
ea ning in rendering their decisions. But under the surface
lies a crucial problem: nearly all these cases were decided in the absence
of real argument by the parties.
The problem lies in the posture of the majority of these cases: Howe,
Dixon, Goings, Aguilar, Johnson, Miller, and Colon were all originally
filed in state court, then removed to federal court by defendants. In most
of them, the defendants then sought a merits dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) n he ba i ha he lain iff e e n agg ie ed b he
violations of BIPA alleged a statutory-standing argument that plainly
implicates whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing. Howe, the first
of these cases to confront the conundrum, summarized the issues
as follows:
Procedurally, Howe finds himself in an awkward position. To
cceed in hi la
i , he m
e abli h ha he i a e n
agg ie ed h ha a
anding a e a ca e f ac i n
under BIPA. However, if he has a cognizable injury under BIPA,
then it follows that he also has constitutional standing and must
proceed in a disfavored forum. Therefore, in an effort to achieve
171. 382 F. Supp. 3d 813 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
172. No. 19-cv-4561, 2019 WL 5536834 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2019).
173. McGinnis, 382 F. Supp. 3d at 819 (first citing Johnson, 2018 WL 3636556; then citing
Aguilar, 2018 WL 3239715; then citing Goings, 2018 WL 2966970; then citing Howe, 2018 WL
2445541; and then citing McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108).
174. Under the analysis in Part I, the presence or absence of disclosure to a third party appears to
be a distinction without a difference. The statutory violation is complete without such disclosure, and
the courts reasoning as to why hi ba e
ced al i la i n d e n
ffice i emi ed n, and
ffe he ame defec a , he Se en h Ci c i deci i n in Gubala.
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remand without fatally undermining his claims, Howe declines to
take a position on constitutional standing and argues that it is
Defendan
b den
e abli h such standing. . . . To avoid
remand, Defendants find themselves having to establish that
Howe has suffered a sufficient injury for purposes of Article III
standing even as their motion to dismiss vigorously contests the
adequacy of his injury for purposes of statutory standing.175
In other words, this posture is a disaster, particularly for a
determination of standing. As discussed above, the most powerful
j ifica i n f he d c ine a lica i n in da a-protection litigation is
to ensure the existence of an adversarial context in which all pertinent
issues of fact and law can be brought before the court. Yet even without
that vital clash of argument, the judges of the Northern District were
compelled to rule on standing, because standing is a jurisdictional
prerequisite and a federal court must always ensure it has jurisdiction,
even if it requires raising issues of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own
motion and resolving them with or without assistance from the parties.176
Even assuming the most impartial and thorough approach by these
judges, they reached decisions in these cases in exactly the manner the
common-law judicial system and the doctrine of standing are meant to
avoid. Worse, the problem is compounding. Howe and Dixon were
decided on the same day.177 Goings came next and relied on Howe and
Dixon in assessing standing.178 Aguilar, in turn, relied on all three,179 then
Johnson incorporated Aguilar, and so on.180 This is an example of what
Hathaway call inc ea ing e n a h de endence, in hich nce a
court makes an initial decision, it is less costly to continue down that same
175. Howe, 2018 WL 2445541, at *3 4.
176. See, e.g., Dixon, 2018 WL 2445292, a *4 (n ing ha he c
ha an inde enden bliga i n
en e ha i ha
bjec ma e j i dic i n ).
177. Howe and Dixon were each decided on May 31, 2018. Howe dismissed the action for lack of
anding de i e n ing ha [d]efendan nd b edl i la ed BIPA if he failed
ide H e
disclosures and obtain his written authorization prior to collecting and storing his fingerprints and did
n c ea e make blicl a ailable a bi me ic da a e en i n and de c i n lic . Howe, 2018
WL 2445541, at *7. Dixon, on the other hand, declined to dismiss on standing grounds. Dixon, 2018
WL 2445292, at *10.
178. Goings, 2018 WL 2966970, a *2 (ci ing he f eg ing in a ing ha [ ]hi ca e j in he
growing ranks of BIPA actions filed in this district and elsewhere in which courts have adjudicated
the sufficiency of the complaint against challenges brought under Rules 12(b)(1) and/ 12(b)(6) ).
179. Aguilar v. Rexnord LLC, No. 17 CV 9019, 2018 WL 3239715, *3 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2018)
(ag eeing i h he anal i in he f eg ing in a e ing he e i n [ f anding] in he c n e
f
an em l e bi me ic cl cking
em ).
180. Johnson v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 17 C 08858, 2018 WL 3636556, *3 (N.D. Ill. July 31,
2018) (citing the foregoing in support of holding that the plaintiff lacked standing).
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a h han i i
change a diffe en a h. 181
The ultimate negative impact of following this tainted path can be seen
in Rivera v. Google, Inc.,182 another BIPA case decided in the Northern
District of Illinois. Unlike the line of cases discussed above, Rivera did
not involve forced use of fingerprinting systems by employees. Rather, it
challenged a fea e f G gle Ph
: G gle c ea ed face-ge me
scans of individuals tagged in photos uploaded to the Google Photos
service, then used the scans to identify and tag those individuals in other
photos.183 This practice, in addition to being alarming, violated BIPA due
G gle fail e
ide n ice f, obtain consent to, the practice.
Yet the district court dismissed the action for lack of standing.184 The
c
ea ning incl ded eliance n he hi d-party disclosure
distinction elucidated in the employee fingerprinting cases, expressly
relying on the non-adversarial decisions in Howe, Miller, and Dixon.185
This is a frightening example of path dependence gone awry. Path
dependence is only a desirable feature of the common-law system as long
as there can be confidence that the decisions against which future cases
will be judged are reached fairly. Such confidence is lacking when judges
are at sea in reaching their decisions, in cases in which neither party
wishes to articulate a position.186
Nor is the problem likely to stop at the Illinois border. Numerous state
legislatures are considering biometric privacy laws like BIPA. 187 To the
181. Hathaway, supra note 138, at 106 07.
182. 366 F. Supp. 3d 998 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
183. Id. at 1001.
184. Id. at 1014.
185. Id. at 1008 09.
186. Indeed, in McGinnis, the district court essentially forced the defendant to move under
Rule 12(b)(1) instead f 12(b)(6). The defendan
iginall a ed ha i a g ing file a m i n
di mi he c m lain f lack f anding, b hen
ed c ncede he anding i e and
filed a motion to dismiss [the case] as time-ba ed. O de a 1, McGinni . U.S. C ld S age, Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 3d 813 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (No. 17 C 08054), ECF No. 24. The court, noting its
inde enden bliga i n en e ha i ha
bjec ma e j i dic i n over a case before deciding
he me i , de ed defendan
file a
i i n a e ha ei he a g e ha McGinni ha ade a el
alleged Article III standing or expressly concedes the issue . . . . If [defendant] concedes standing,
then McGinnis shall file a position paper that argues in support of standing . . . . Id. at 1 2. Only
after this express order did the defendant move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Incredibly, after the plaintiff refiled his suit in Illinois state court, the defendant sought to remove the
case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship, swapping positions on standing in the second
round. The case was again dismissed for lack of standing. See McGinnis v. U.S. Cold Storage, Inc.,
No. 19 C 00845, 2019 WL 7049921 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2019).
187. See Eric J. Shinabarger & Alessandra V. Swanson, Several States Considering Laws
Regulating the Collection of Biometric Data, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP PRIV. & DATA SEC. L. BLOG
(Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.winston.com/en/privacy-law-corner/several-states-considering-laws-
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extent that such laws resemble BIPA,188 it will be natural for litigants to
point to the Northern District of Illinois decisions construing BIPA, and
for other judges to accord some respect to those decisions.189 This
poisoned precedent could thereby hinder application of these new laws.190
2.

Policy Preferences

Analysis of the case law suggests that standing dismissals in dataprotection litigation are driven by a range of judicial policy preferences,
ranging from substantive skepticism about privacy to concerns about
docket management.
a.

Skepticism About Privacy

Man
anding deci i n be a j dge
ke ici m ab
i ac
harms, ranging from failure of imagination to outright hostility.191 Judicial
skepticism about privacy may have sociological and psychological roots.
Lior Strahilevitz notes that me 20% f he
la i n a e
i ac
nc nce ned ; ha i , he a e indi id al n
al ing hei
n i ac
and having a difficult time understanding why anyone would care about
privacy . . . . 192 He further notes that extroverts who are more likely to
be privacy unconcerned play an outsize role in public life, including in
policymaking and serving as leaders in business and government.193 Some
Article III judges, each of whom must go through an extensive and public
regulating-the-collection-of-biometric-data.html [https://perma.cc/5T8V-WHUA].
188. And it is likely that they will. See, e.g., id. (noting, for example, that proposed New York law
is
b an iall imila
BIPA ).
189. Fortunately, the Ninth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion of Rivera, affirming the
presence of standing in a nearly identical lawsuit against Facebook. See Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932
F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 937 (2020).
190. To end this analysis on an appropriately Kafkaesque note, Rivera distinguished a previous
Northern District of Illinois finding standing arising from collection of face scans in violation of
BIPA. One of the bases of the di inc i n: i al d e n a ea ha he a ie eci el eed
hi i e f he di ic c
in ha ca e, a he defendan did n challenge he lain iff
anding.
Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1014 n.19 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
191. The Supreme Court itself indulged in such skepticism in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, with Justice
Ali
ining ha [i] i diffic l
imagine h
he di emina i n f an incorrect zip code, without
m e, c ld
k an c nc e e ha m. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016). As Wu notes, this
type of speculation usurps the function of the legislature, which determined the practice to be
sufficiently harmful to be worth banning. See Wu, supra note 15, at 459.
192. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010,
2026 (2013).
193. Id. ( If he i ac nc nce ned a e indeed m e di
ed
a ici a e hea il in he li ical
process, with privacy fundamentalists tending to remain on the sidelines in political debates, the
malle g
ice in lic deba e ma be j a l d e en l de han he la ge c h
. ).
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vetting process, may be among that group that places less value on
privacy. When confronted with the opportunity to evaluate the risk of
harm, they might be expected to express skepticism about privacy harms,
particularly those in cases of improper data collection or retention.
Concerns about psychology-based skepticism arise from the
ch l gical c nce f m i a ed ea ning : a endenc
ie m e
skeptically claims that n c n e
ne
n ie and e e ience .194
The endenc
a d ke ici m i
f e en l
nc n ci , n
c n ci . 195 And it may offer at least a partial explanation of, for
example, Gubala, in which Judge Posner a very public figure in his
decades on the bench opined that a plaintiff whose personal information
has been retained by a private company in direct violation of federal law
for over a decade has nevertheless suffered no harm.196
It is possible, too, that judges in data-protection litigation are motivated
by conscious, substantive views. This phenomenon is readily observable
in cases with a substantially political character; many are the Supreme
Court cases whose outcome can be predicted as five to four decisions on
conservative-liberal lines.197 It may also account for the skepticism
expressed by many judges when evaluating the likelihood that a particular
data-protection violation may lead to harm. Take, for example, numerous
cases in which judges do not heed the requirement to construe allegations
in the light most favorable to the non-movant in evaluating studies of harm
following data breaches, and take the curious position that there is no
standing even though a substantial percentage of the proposed class will
suffer identity theft, turning the notion of expected value on its head.198
194. Fallon, supra note 13, at 1098 (describing m i a ed ea ning a he endenc f
m
f
us . . . to look skeptically on factual assertions as well as arguments that contradict our prior,
ide l gicall
ff ed e f belief ).
195. Id.
196. See Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017). Nichol presents a similar
a g men , c n ending ha [a] eli e j dge
mma il de e mine hich in e e a e
h f legal
cognizance, they unsurprisingly embrace concerns that strike clo e
h me,
aining ha m ha
mi
he e e ience and edilec i n f hei
n li e . Nich l, supra note 13, at 304. In a similar
vein, Ma he T k n n e ha c
e amina i n f kn ledge end
be b ad and ab ac
a he han a ic la , and ha , [i]n he F
h Amendmen c n e , c
d hi b eaching a
conclusion about the collective knowledge possessed by society and then imputing that knowledge to
he e n a i e. Ma he T k n, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 139, 150 (2016).
197. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 13, at 1095 96 ( [T]he J ice
b an i e c n i i nal ie
inevitably drive standing decisions in a number of important areas. Abundant examples confirm this
he i . ).
198. See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275 76 (4 h Ci . 2017) ( E en if e c edi he
Plain iff allega i n ha 33% f h e affec ed b D n VAMC da a b eache ill bec me ictims
f iden i hef , i f ll
ha e 66% f e e an affec ed ill ffe n ha m. ); In re SuperValu,
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These judges appear to hold the view that privacy harms are not real
harms, and rule accordingly.
b.

Pro-Business/Anti-Consumer Bias

Two broad, related trends likely exacerbate problems in data-protection
litigation. First, [i]n he a fif een ea , lain iff a e l ing, and
business defendants are winning, a huge majority of Federal Rules private
enforcement cases . . . . 199 Second, courts have been increasingly hostile
to class actions.200 Almost all data-protection lawsuits in federal court fall
into those buckets. Few are the data breaches affecting, or the datagathering schemes targeting, only a handful of individuals. And standing,
although not literally a Federal Rules issue, is a similar type of procedural
inquiry. The frequently successful challenges to standing in dataprotection litigation especially the low standing rates in consumer
protection cases are less surprising when considered in light of
these trends.
Both these broad trends and the specific context of data-protection
litigation exemplify the concern that standing doctrine works to favor
those with power and privilege.201 While a full accounting of the factors
underlying that tendency is beyond the scope of this Article, troubling
parallels to retrenchment in private enforcement actions exist. For
example, one study notes a substantial increase in amicus filings by probusiness and conse a i e g
in he S eme C
cla -action
cases since 1994, particularly noting increased activity from the Chamber
of Commerce, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Washington Legal
Foundation, and the Defense Research Institute.202 Each of those groups
filed amicus briefs in Spokeo, as did numerous businesses and credit

Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 14-MD-2586, 2018 WL 1189327, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar.
7, 2018) (evaluating report stating that approxima el 40% f indi id al
h e ca d n mbe
ee
c m mi ed in 2013 became f a d ic im and c ncl ding ha hi e
e abli he ha he
majority of consumers whose payment cards are compromised in a breach will not become fraud
victims as a result f he b each ).
199. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against
Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1518 (2017).
200. See, e.g., id. at 1518 21 (finding that pro-class action outcomes at the Supreme Court have
substantially declined since the late 1980s).
201. Nichol, supra note 13, at 304. Nichol argues that the standing doctrine
ema icall fa
the powerful over the powerless. The malleable, value-laden injury determination has operated to give
g ea e c edence in e e
f i ilege han
ide claim f di ad an age. Id.
202. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 199, at 1525 (analyzing impact of increase in amicus
filings on Supreme Court class-action jurisprudence).
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bureaus.203 In the legislative sphere, technology companies have lobbied
against developing privacy laws.204 Increased responsiveness of courts
and legislators to these special interests helps explain low standing rates
in data-protection litigation and the absence of legislative action to combat
judicial hostility to data-protection claims.
c.

Docket Management

The Seventh Ci c i ma ha e aid he ie a
l d: The
standing rule reduces the workload of the federal judiciary . . . . 205 While
literally true, that is neither an accepted nor acceptable justification for
standing doctrine.206 The e i ence f a Ca e
C n
e
d e n
depend on how pleased the court will be to hear it. Article III does not
give the judiciary the ability to set its caseload. And a dispute will be no
le ad e a ial be een he a ie if i i he en h hea ing n a c
calendar rather than the first. Indeed, around the time that the Supreme
Court threw standing jurisprudence for a loop in Clapper, it admonished
that federal courts are obligated to hear cases falling within
their jurisdiction.207
Yet the appeal of the standing dismissal to the federal judge is
impossible to ignore. The massive and increasing caseload in the federal
courts is well known. In the data-protection context, cases typically
promise to be long and involved. Most arise from large-scale data
breaches or inappropriate, indiscriminate data collection. As such, they
are usually brought as class actions and implicate complex technical
issues. One can certainly understand why overworked judges might be
eager to get such cases off their dockets.
With that in mind, dismissal for lack of standing has a special appeal
over other means of dispensing with a case: it is a non-merits dismissal.
Even if erroneous or improperly motivated, a dismissal for lack of
standing works relatively little injustice, as its effect is only to banish the
203. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, Supreme Court Docket No. 13-1339, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/13-1339.htm
[https://perma.cc/2FF2-YUMD].
204. See, e.g., Issie Lapowsky, Tech Lobbyists Push to Defang California s Landmark Privacy
Law, WIRED (Apr. 29, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/california-privacy-law-techlobby-bills-weaken/ [https://perma.cc/Q4WL-9PYW] (discussing lobbying efforts to undermine the
California Consumer Privacy Act).
205. Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 2017).
206. Wu characterizes the Gubala court s reliance on a fea f being fl ded
i h li iga i n a
a in e en iall legi la i e de e mina i n. See Wu, supra note 15, at 458.
207. See Le ma k In l . S a ic C n l C m nen , Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014) ( [A] fede al
c
bliga i n hea and decide ca e i hin i j i dic i n i i all nflagging. (in e nal
quotation marks omitted)).
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suit to state court. Moreover, as the data show, state-law and common-law
claims predominate in data-protection litigation the majority of cases
analyzed involved such claims, while fewer than half of cases asserted
claims under federal law. Allowing state courts to deal with state-law
claims is a hallmark feature of the federal system, CAFA notwithstanding.
The N he n Di ic f Illin i BIPA e ie f ca e ma
ceed
from this impulse. Most were brought initially in state court, then removed
to federal court by defendants who seemed intent on challenging
lain iff
igh
b ing i a all. C nf n ed i h he
ec f
overseeing a lengthy, complicated class-action lawsuit brought by
plaintiffs who did not want to be in federal court in the first place against
defendants who appeared to be engaging in gamesmanship, the judges of
the Northern District of Illinois may well have viewed dismissal for lack
of standing as the best of all possible worlds.
The data are potentially consistent with this explanation. In particular,
appellate courts have been significantly more solicitous of plaintiffs in
data-protection cases, finding standing in 75% of cases, compared to only
51% of district courts. In data-breach cases, which likely present both the
most technically complicated inquiries and the most diffuse harms,
appellate courts upheld standing in 79% of cases, compared to a mere 41%
of district court cases.
Figure 7:
Standing Outcome at District Court
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Figure 8:
Standing Outcome at Circuit Court

3.

Ignorance

Perhaps more innocent, but equally troubling, is the prospect that
federal judges believe there is no substantial risk of harm in dataprotection cases because they do not understand issues like aggregation of
information from multiple sources and non-monetary harm flowing from
privacy violations.
Tha di ic c
j dge , and i e
ibl lain iff la e , d n
understand the problem posed by aggregation is revealed by how little
treatment the subject receives in the case law. And those few cases that do
engage with the idea inspire little confidence. For example, in Cooper v.
Slice Technologies, Inc.,208 the plaintiffs brought a proposed class action
against Slice, which operated a service called UnrollMe. UnrollMe
purported to serve its users by accessing a e email acc n , canning
it for spam messages, and unsubscribing users from further such
messages.209 The seasoned observer of privacy practices will not be
208. No. 17-CV-7102, 2018 WL 2727888 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2018).
209. Id. at *1.
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i ed lea n ha Un llMe ac al b ine m del a
can he
email accounts to which it was given access and then ell an n mi ed
data gleaned therefrom to third parties, thereby enabling more and
different spam to be sent to its customers.210
In alleging the harmful nature of this practice, the plaintiffs argued that
research has shown that purportedly anonymized information can be
trivially de-anonymized.211 Plaintiffs emphasized that the types of
messages UnrollMe harvested included Lyft ride receipts, which are even
more susceptible to de-anonymization than many other types of emails as
they include start points, destinations, ride times, unique customer
identifiers, and other information.212 But the district court tried to cleave
he e allega i n in
di inc
e f ha m: elling n n-anonymized
da a, hich he c
f nd be he m c nc e e ha m, and ha
UnrollMe sold anonymized emails, but in such a way that the buyers could
en iall dean n mi e he da a and nc e e nal inf ma i n. 213
The c
in e e ed lain iff allega i n nde he fi
in
be that
Un llMe ld he e email add e , and f nd hem in fficien
beca e i a n nece a il he ca e ha he email add e
a
214
incl ded in he an n mi ed da a e ha Un llMe ld.
As to deanonymization, the court pared down the complaint to allegations
(1) that [r]esearchers have revealed the ease [with] which
particular people can be identified from purportedly anonymized
data sources, particularly for taxi trips, and (2) that Uber, one of
Un llMe clien , ha a le -than-sterling reputation for
snooping on customers. But the mere possibility that someone
migh dean n mi e Plain iff email i n en gh c n i e
injury in fact.215
This crabbed reading of the complaint betrays, at best, a
misunderstanding of the import of aggregation in data protection. The
lain iff c nce n i n , a he c
ed, ha Ube migh be able
to divine the email address of a customer from the data sold to it by
Un llMe. Ra he , he gi f lain iff allega i n i in fac ha he pes
of emails UnrollMe harvested and sold to third parties include types of
information that make it very easy to identify individuals, even if their
names or email addresses are redacted. In particular, a third party might
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Complaint at 12, Cooper, 2018 WL 2727888 (No. 17-CV-7102).
Id. at 13.
Cooper, 2018 WL 2727888, at *2.
Id.
Id.
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easily glean details about individuals from their Lyft rides, such as home
and work locations, schedules, and so forth. That information could, in
turn, subject an individual to great harm.216
Whether a federal court would view even that larger risk of harm as
sufficient to confer standing is, unfortunately, not clear. But at the very
least, greater understanding of the risks in play in data-protection
litigation should lead to better outcomes.
Ignorance of the harms in data-protection litigation may also arise from
common fallacies. Ignacio Cofone and Adriana Robertson, for instance,
have studied the impact of the cognitive bias known a n n-belief in the
la
f la ge n mbe
(NBLLN) n i ac .217 This bias describes the
fact that afflicted individuals underestimate how informative each
marginal item of information disclosed will be.218 While Cofone and
R be n f c
n e laining he
i ac a ad , 219 this bias would
al infl ence a j dge a e men f i k in a da a-protection case.220
Taking Cooper again a an e am le, he c
inion certainly admits
of the possibility that it does not realize how much information can
accurately be deduced from Lyft ride data.221
Th
gh anal i f he fede al c
deci i n in da a-protection

216. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 104, at 1705 ( Acc e i e eiden ifica i n make all f
ec e
fundamentally easier to discover and reveal. Our enemies will find it easier to connect us to facts that
they can use to blackmail, harass, defame, frame, or discriminate against us. Powerful reidentification
ill d a e e
ne f cl e
ha I call
e nal da aba e f in. ).
217. Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Consumer Privacy in a Behavioral World, 69
HASTINGS L.J. 1471 (2018) (arguing in favor of regulation of consumer data based on cognitive
biases).
218. Id. at 1489 90 (n ing ha he a e age e n i n
a ic la l g d a e ima ing he
inf ma i ene
f each iece f ne l a i ing inf ma i n, and if he ffe f m NBLLN, he
will underestimate how much ha iece f inf ma i n di cl e (em ha is in original)); see also id.
(n ing ha an indi id al migh mi akenl belie e ha [a hi d- a
] belief ab
hei e nal
information does not change much when they provide the [third-party] with new information that is,
in fact, still informati e ).
219. A he
i , [ ]hi a ad can be mma i ed b he f ll ing e i n: h i i ha
individuals consistently indicate that they value privacy, while simultaneously giving their privacy
a a f alm n hing? Id. at 1476.
220. Relatedly, Nash notes that courts assessing probabilistic injuries may fundamentally
mi nde and he anal i : S me j dge d n ee ha a mall risk of a significant harm is the same
as a certain loss of a harm of a smaller magnitude, and . . . that since the latter is a sufficient basis for
anding
h ld be he f me . Na h, supra note 15, at 1310.
221. As another example, in Antman v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the district court found substantial
risk of harm did not exist despite allegations that defendant had lost information about the plaintiff
incl ding hi name, d i e licen e inf ma i n, and hi bank acc n and
ing n mbe , n he
basis that this was not enough information to plausibly enable fraud or identity theft. No. 15-cv01175-LB, 2018 WL 2151231, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2018). No attention was given to the
possibility that this information might trivially be tied to other information available about plaintiff
or the possibility of harms beyond fraud and identity theft.
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litigation reveals numerous flaws and inconsistencies in handling the
standing inquiry. The data support various plausible explanations for these
errors and may point the way toward appropriate corrective measures.
III. CORRECTING COURSE
In previous Parts, this Article showed that federal courts systematically
err in assessing standing in data-protection litigation. By analyzing
hundreds of these cases, this Article identified numerous factors
contributing to these errors, from choices about precedent to ignorance
about key factual issues. It now turns to normative points.
Increasing liability for data gatherers and brokers who violate law is
desirable. Among other things, putting these entities on the hook for
gathering and losing information will incentivize stronger protection
while deterring overcollection. To get there, courts will have to administer
the standing inquiry differently in data-protection litigation than they have
to date.
This Part begins by suggesting methods to increase the percentage of
data-protection cases that survive standing challenges, including
reframing the standing inquiry and the potential effects of legislative
action. It then discusses the implications of allowing more cases to go
f
a d, incl ding ealigning da a ga he e incen i e and ad ancing
development of federal law. Theoretically, it contributes to the growing
literature of data protection that argues for stronger protection of private
information at the design and enforcement stages.
A.

Reframing the Standing Inquiry

If the pathology of problems with standing doctrine in data-protection
litigation can be traced to a single source, the leading candidate appears
to be failure to grapple with the purpose of standing doctrine in assessing
whether standing exists in a particular case. Examining the allegations in
any given data-protection lawsuit from those principles will rarely support
any Article III-based objection to jurisdiction, no matter how skeptical
any given judge might be about privacy harms. Conversely, when analysis
is unmoored from its purpose, courts, for the reasons discussed above,
reach results that conflict with the purposes of Article III. The data
suggest that courts are indeed at sea in most cases when assessing
standing, as they typically resort to rote application of the three-part test
with no discussion of its purpose. Returning to the adversity-based
justification for standing as the foundation of standing analysis in dataprotection litigation would lead to more consistent, coherent, and
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salutary outcomes.222
To do so would require express recognition by the federal courts that
standing must be evaluated differently in different cases. The courts have
done so implicitly in their approach to other types of cases, such as those
implicating the Establishment Clause.223 Explicitly acknowledging that
the doctrine applies differently in different types of cases would enable
more thoughtful examination of the issues.224
Reframing the harms in data-protection litigation may also lead to
improved outcomes. Approaching lawsuits solely from the standpoint of
substantive rights and harms invites exactly the type of judicial skepticism
against which this Article argues. By contrast, viewing data harms as
violations of private procedural rights could simplify the inquiry around
standing. In Lujan, for example, the Supreme Court noted that procedural
igh a e ni e: The e n h ha been acc ded a
ced al igh
to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all
he n mal anda d f ed e abili and immediac . 225
Data protection is a perfect candidate for this kind of treatment.
Construing data protection as a private procedural right would give force
to statutory and common-law restrictions on gathering, using, and selling
data that are too often disregarded by courts today but are intended to
ec indi id al c nc e e, b an i e in e e in a iding iden i
theft or exposure of private information. In the data-breach context,
similar rights should be considered implied in the relationship between
individual and data holder. It is hard to imagine that an individual would
willingly agree to turn over their private information to an entity that had
no intention to protect it. By implying a right to have data holders use
reasonable care in protecting information they have acquired, the
reasonable expectations of individuals and their ability to obtain redress
for violations of those expectations are advanced.226
222. A corollary suggestion would be to move away from analyzing standing in any given case
with reference to Clapper and instead focus on precedent in a closer context than that presented in
Clapper.
223. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 13, at 1071 75 (analyzing the Supreme Court s Establishment
Clause standing jurisprudence).
224. See, e.g., id. at 1107 08 ( [The Supreme Court] ought to recognize that what counts as an
injury depends on the provision under which a plaintiff brings suit. This modest, clarifying recognition
would bring increased transparency to divisions about standing. Moreover, it should provoke no
emba a men , ei he
he C
in i i nall
an f he J ice indi id all . ).
225. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
226. The Ninth Circuit took an important step down this path in its decision on remand in Spokeo
by agreeing with the Second Circuit that Spokeo stands for the
i i n ha an alleged
ced al
violation [of a statute] can by itself manifest concrete injury where Congress conferred the procedural
igh
ec a lain iff c nc e e in e e and he e he
ced al i la i n e en a i k f
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Relatedly, passage of a federal data-privacy law could turn the tide.
Thi A icle da a h fede al c ts are more likely to find standing in
cases asserting violations of federal statutes.227 While the specific
authorization for a cause of action should not matter in conducting the
standing inquiry, better to use this systemic error to improve outcomes
than to ignore its existence. Such a law could make explicit requirements
for reasonable care in protecting information. Even purely technical
violations of the law would likely suffice for standing under the analysis
e f h in he Nin h Ci c i
ec nd Spokeo decision.
B.

Implications of Increasing Liability for Data Gatherers

Holding data gatherers to account for their wrongdoing should benefit
those who are wronged, realign data-gathering incentives to be more
socially beneficial, and contribute to development of federal law on
data protection.
Intuitively, the more data-protection cases that survive challenges to
standing, the more frequently data gatherers will be held liable or pressed
to settle in the wake of their wrongdoing. That intuition finds support in
the literature. A study of litigation following data breaches from 2000
2010 shows substantially higher settlement rates in cases where plaintiffs
allege ac al ha m, ing a na
defini i n f ac al ha m ha ack
closely with the analysis in Part I c nce ning fede al c
e em ha i
228
on PII. The d f nd ha lain iff allega i n f financial ha m a e
correlated with a 30% increase in the probability of settlement . . . . 229
By reframing what constitutes actual harm, both at the standing stage
and into the merits, more cases should result in settlement rather than
dismissal. Thus, more frequent findings of standing in data-protection
litigation will lead to more frequent redress for individuals who suffer
privacy harms. Even recognizing that significant merits challenges remain
in data-protection litigation once standing is established, as more cases go

eal ha m
ha c nc e e in e e . Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
227. See supra section II.A.3.
228. Sasha Romanosky, David Hoffman & Alessandro Acquisti, Empirical Analysis of Data
Breach Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 74, 95 96 (2014). The define ac al ha m f
e f anal i a he e he lain iff c m lain allege an ac al l
d e
he b each (e.g.,
if the plaintiff alleges fraudulent charges on a credit card, stolen money from a checking or savings
acc n ,
he ch c
inc ed f m c iminal ac i i ). Id. O he f m f alleged ha m ch
as preventive costs from credit monitoring, emotional distress, invasion of privacy, or
emba a men a e not considered actual harm. Id.
229. Id. at 98.
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forward, more successes (or good settlements) will follow.
Increasing liability for data holders would also lead to two related
benefits: increased incentive to protect data and decreased incentive to
gather or hold it. The current balance in litigation does not adequately
incentivize businesses to protect the data they are holding, since they stand
a good chance of escaping liability in the event of a breach. In fact, they
are incentivized to extract every bit of data they can, even if to do so
violates law, because they know they likely will not be held to account.
Indeed, at least one study has found that technology companies are not
concerned about privacy, instead focusing their resources in other areas.230
Shifting the balance toward liability should deter marginal collectors and
spur those for whom data brokerage remains viable to expend more
resources on security.231 It may also help
a e
i ac la
lide
toward legal endogeneity by making it less feasible for businesses to hide
behind showy compliance mechanisms that have no real force.232
Allowing more cases to go forward should also at least clarify the
merits challenges in data-protection cases. For example, the causation
conundrum identified by some courts in the standing context whether to
wait until identity theft actually occurs to sue, at the risk of defendants
arguing that another intervening data breach is the cause foreshadows a
merits issue that can be expected to arise in most data breach cases. The
fact that approximately half of all data-protection cases and more than
half of data-breach cases filed in federal court are being thrown out
before reaching the merits substantially slows the development of case
law addressing these critical issues.
Additionally, more merits cases may help to rescue privacy law from
being overtaken by consumer contract law. Omri Ben-Shahar and Lior
Strahilevitz, among others, have noted the significant role played by
contractual relationships in privacy suits.233 While many data-protection
230. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 659, 685 86 (2018)
( Enginee
king a a didn eall hink ab
i ac . N did he e ec i e , f ha
matter. Larger companies that say they take privacy seriously had a different problem: prioritization.
Privacy was simply not a top p i i f enginee beca e i a c
ded
b
he manda e .
(footnote omitted)).
231. A robust federal data-protection law would arguably do better in achieving these goals. But
the dream of such a law is no reason to delay correctives in the judiciary.
232. See Ari Ezra Waldman, P i ac La
Fal e P omi e, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 773, 778 (2020)
( A m e echn l g c m anie ain c ea ive pictures of their legal compliance, lawyers and judges
become more likely to defer to the toothless structures companies create by either accepting them as
evidence of substantive adherence to the law or actually incorporating them into statutes, thereby
nde mining he ca aci f la
achie e m e b
i ac
ec i n f
e . (f n e
omitted)).
233. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Contracting Over Privacy:
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cases play out in the shadow of terms of service, myriad cases arise in the
absence of any such relationship.234 Permitting more of these cases to go
forward should lead to increased development of privacy law at the
federal level.
One concern, of course, is that allowing more cases to clear the
standing bar would increase the workload of the federal bench. However,
the feared flood of litigation may not come to pass. One cannot lose what
one does not gather, and one cannot be sued for what one has not lost (or
gathered improperly). More litigation should decrease incentives to gather
data, which should therefore lead to fewer violations and fewer suits.
These changes to the law and the incentives it creates would also help
remedy the distributional effects of current standing doctrine. As this
Article discusses, the present balance appears to favor corporate interests
and to denigrate harms like anxiety as unworthy of judicial attention.
Recognizing that these types of harms are cognizable in federal court
should shift that balance. Moreover, even if merits decisions begin to go
against data-protection plaintiffs, those decisions may highlight gaps in
existing law and serve as a rallying point for policy advocacy. Examples
f hi hen men n ab nd, ch a he ecen enac men f a e enge
n la in Ne Y k. While man
hed f enac men f ch a la
for years, a 2014 criminal case crystallized some of the shortcomings of
existing New York law.235 Advocates such as the Cyber Civil Rights
Initiative highlighted that decision as an example of the failings of
harassment law to curb non-consensual pornography, and argue for
reshaping the legal landscape to better protect the interests of women by
treating non-consensual pornography as a privacy issue236 leading, in
Introduction, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (2016) (examining various interactions between contract law and
privacy issues).
234. Point-of-sale breaches are a ready example, as there are typically no terms of service presented
or agreed to in a retail transaction. Moreover, tech firms increasingly voracious appetite for data
leads to situations in which lawsuits arise in the absence of a contractual relationship. For example,
the Google Photos face-scan case, Rivera, involved two named plaintiffs one a Google Photos user
subject to Google s terms of service, but the other a friend of a Google Photos user.
235. See Emma Grey Ellis, New York s Revenge Porn Law is a Flawed Step Forward, WIRED
(July 24, 2019, 5:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/new-york-revenge-porn-law/
[https://perma.cc/T9CA-229Y] (discussing case dismissing harassment claim in hich [a] man
allegedly shared nude images of his gi lf iend n T i e and en hem he famil and em l e
beca e Ne Y k la a ha ime define[d] ha a men a di ec c mm nica i n i h he ic im ).
236. See, e.g., Danielle Citron & Mary Anne Franks, E al a ing Ne Yo k Re enge Po n La :
A Missed Opportunity to Protect Sexual Privacy, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/evaluating-new-yorks-revenge-porn-law-a-missed-opportunityto-protect-sexual-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/MK38-NEPN] (highlighting problems with treating
revenge porn as a harassment issue rather than a privacy issue); see also Danielle Keats Citron &
Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 347 (2014) ( O
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a , he na
ing f he ga in Ne Y k ha a men la . Thi
e
of pattern could play out if courts adjudicating the merits of dataprotection suits continue, for whatever reason, to indulge in skepticism
about data-protection issues. In short, one way or the other, developing
fede al la
n i ac
ill hif he la
e e i n, and he blic
should respond accordingly.237
C.

Theoretical Approach

Focusing on the leading Supreme Court and appellate decisions on
standing in data-protection litigation leaves too much on the table. Data
takes many forms, and so too the litigation arising from its use, misuse,
and loss. Courts can and do tinker with what they consider precedential in
any given case. Thus, this Article proceeds from the belief that
examination of a much broader set of cases enables new insights into the
standing quandary. From those insights, it seeks to push the federal
judicial system back onto a particular path taking seriously the
applicable purpose of standing doctrine in adjudicating standing
challenges. Adopting that approach would have consequences beyond the
sphere of data-protection. While other areas of law are beyond the scope
of this Article, it is plausible to suggest that a more explicitly nuanced
approach to standing in all cases would yield more accurate decisions than
the current inquiry, which might fairly be deemed one-size-fits-none. This
type of approach might also diminish the potential for judges to hide
preference-motivated decisions on standing behind that opaque inquiry.
Additionally, although this Article shows the connection between
Clapper and denials of standing is strong, it can show only correlation
rather than causation. Some judges undoubtedly feel they are bound by
the reasoning and approach set forth in Clapper. Others may reach to
Clapper to justify skepticism about the harms asserted in a particular case.
The motivating factors discussed in section II.B suggest that the latter
situation occurs more often than might be desired. Either way, this Article
hopes to remedy the issue to some extent by laying bare Clapper lack f
connection to data-protection litigation.
None of this should be read to sugge ha fi ing he fede al c
society has a poor track record in addressing harms that take women and girls as their primary targets.
Though much progress has been made towards gender equality, much social, legal, and political
power remains in the hands of men. The fight to recognize domestic violence, sexual assault, and
sexual harassment as serious issues has been long and difficult, and the tendency to tolerate, trivialize,
di mi he e ha m e i . ).
237. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2025 (1996) (arguing that he e e i e f nc i n f la make m
en e in c nnec i n i h eff
change n m ).
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approach to standing in data-protection litigation (or elsewhere) is a
panacea, nor that every data-protection lawsuit is meritorious. Rather, this
Article seeks to offer solutions to a threshold problem, a necessary step
on the path to enable a substantial shift in the treatment of private
information in both theory and practice.
Connected to that goal is the question of whether private enforcement
can or will move the needle. There is reason to believe that it could.
Waldman, for instance, finds that regulatory action has had some success
in inducing industry to emphasize privacy more strongly in their design
activities.238 Private enforcement could have a similar impact. In light of
he FTC ecen , idel c i ici ed esolution of privacy issues with both
Facebook239 and Equifax,240 more robust private enforcement becomes
even more attractive. These lackluster settlements suggest deep capture is
a
k, dimini hing he FTC a e i e and abili
eg la e ind
241
players sufficiently.
CONCLUSION
By looking beyond the relative handful of cases studied in existing
li e a e, hi A icle c m ehen i e a
ach iden ifie
emic
e
e ha c n ib e
he c
e ne
deci i n in da aprotection litigation. Most notably, those pressures include widespread
overreliance on case law with little application to the issues posed by dataprotection lawsuits and failure to consider the purpose of standing
doctrine in administering the inquiry. It then proposes new solutions
tailored to those systemic pressures, most importantly the need for federal
238. See Waldman, supra note 230, at 665 66 ( [C] m anie h ha e been he bjec f
ng
regulatory intervention are more successful at embedding the importance of consumer privacy into
de ign. Thi
en a a h a f
ing b FTC enf cemen
make a diffe ence. ).
239. See, e.g., Challenge to FTC/Facebook 2019 Settlement, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR. (2019),
https://epic.org/privacy/facebook/epic2019-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/W57A-RYFA] ( [The
FTC e lemen i h Faceb k] d e n incen i i e Faceb k fi i dee l
blema ic b ine
model and practices. Instead, the e lemen fail
meaningf ll limi Faceb k c llec i n, e,
and ha ing f c n me da a im e an ac all inde enden
e igh
e Faceb k
e f
personal data. On the whole, the settlement is not meaningfully different from the 2012 Consent Order
ha
ed be ef ll inade a e in he ake f Faceb k c n in ed i ac i la i n f m
2012
he e en . ); see also id. (collecting political and media criticism of the settlement).
240. See, e.g., Rachel Siegel, Did Someone Fo ge o do he Ma h? Con me , Ad oca e Rail
Against Lowered Equifax Cash Payouts, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2019, 2:53 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/01/did-someone-forget-do-math-consumersadvocates-rail-against-lowered-equifax-cash-payouts/ [https://perma.cc/44TH-TSK5] (discussing
c i ici m f di ib i n f e lemen f nd in E ifa
e lemen i h he FTC).
241. See Cohen, supra note 15, a 555 ( Dee ca
e or capture at the level of ideology
proceeds as well-resourced repeat players work to craft compelling narratives about the contours of
legal en i lemen and he
c e f legal in i i n . ).
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judges to reorient their approach to the standing inquiry by focusing on
the need to preserve adversarial presentation of the issues. Resolving the
systemic errors in decisions on standing should advance the goal of data
protection by permitting additional lawsuits to go forward, thereby better
aligning private incentives with the public good.
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